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Privileges or Immunities: The
Missing Link in Establishing
Congressional Power to Abrogate
State Eleventh Amendment Immunity
BY WILLIAM J. RICH*
When Congress acts pursuant to its legitimate authority to
establish rights, privileges or immunities for United States citizens, no
state should be allowed to abridge those rights. The Fourteenth
Amendment not only established protection for fundamental rights, it
also changed federal and state relationships in order to protect future
generations from state interference with privileges or immunities
established by either the Constitution or laws of the national
government. Whenever it was asked the question, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects rights
established by federal law. In recent years, however, lawyers have
forgotten to repeat that question. In decisions protecting state
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, Supreme Court
Justices appear to have forgotten the answer.
:: Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Washburn colleagues who offered feedback on early drafts of this article, including
Professors Megan Ballard, Myrl Duncan, Allen Easley, Alex Glashausser, Ali Khan,
Rogelio Lasso, Lynette Petty, Steven Ramirez, and David Ryan.
1. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001); Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Critics have harshly
attacked the Court's recent extensions of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., John P.
LaVelle, Sactioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex parte Young, Expansion of Hans
Immunity, and Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 786
(1999) (attacking anti-tribal judicial activism); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of
Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review, Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LoY.
L.A. L. REv. 1351 (2000) (finding that the Supreme Court's conception of state
sovereignty fails to adequately assure the supremacy of federal law); James G. Wilson, The
Eleventh Amendment Cases: Going "Too Far" with Judicial Neofederalism, 33 Loy. L.A.
REV. 1687 (labeling the Supreme Court's recent Eleventh Amendment decisions as "some
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The Supreme Court's assault on federal power began with its
decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida2 holding that the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution did not empower Congress to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. In 1999 and 2000, that holding
was broadened to limit enforcement of federal laws protecting patent
rights,3 the Fair Labor Standards Act,4 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act,5 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.6 The
three most recent cases involve individual claims for what could be
characterized as "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States."7  In these cases, however, the clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on which such claims should be based was ignored;
judges, litigants and scholars no longer recognize its most obvious
meaning.
Throughout the Twentieth Century, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause stood as a monument
to all that it seemed to promise and failed to deliver. Within the
Supreme Court, arguments that privileges or immunities included a
broad range of fundamental rights, including but not limited to those
identified by the Bill of Rights, ended almost as soon as they began.
As frequently noted by commentators, the Slaughter-House Cases8
of its worst in decades" for improperly "diluting the constitutional and federal statutory
rights of millions of people"); Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1304 (1999) (arguing against expanded federalism and demonstrating that courts are
using federalism doctrine for political or ideological reasons); Daniel J. Meltzer, State
Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011
(2000) (explaining that the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions cause harm
while failing to promote any coherent conception of state autonomy). Most of these critics
have focused upon the Eleventh Amendment itself, noting the harm caused by the Court's
doctrine that lacks either textual support or internal coherence. This article shifts the
focus away from the direct assault on Eleventh Amendment doctrine to a reexamination
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Virtually all participants in the debate agree that the
Fourteenth Amendment overrides the Eleventh Amendment. This article builds upon
that agreement to demonstrate that, at least as to those federal laws that establish
"privileges or immunities," the Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions are demonstrably
wrong.
2. 517 U.S. 44,76 (1996).
3. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 627.
4. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 706.
5. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62.
6. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 955.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (denying claim that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protected inherent business rights of butchers in New Orleans who objected to law
requiring them to move their operations to a single slaughter-house).
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had the effect of making the Clause "practically a dead letter."9
Most discussions about the Privileges or Immunities Clause that
have taken place since 1872 have focused either directly or indirectly
on questions about which, if any, inherent fundamental rights should
receive protection."0 Blinded by this debate, most writers have
ignored alternative roles for the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In
particular, they have generally failed to consider implications of the
majority decision in the Slaughter-House Cases for debates about the
role of Congress in protecting individuals from the action of states. A
typical dismissive reference was to the effect that, "[u]nder Slaughter-
House, the Privileges or Immunities Clause has no independent
9. Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 144 (1949). See also THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 965 (E. Corwin, ed. 1964) (explaining that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
"enjoys the distinction of having been rendered a 'practical nullity' by a single decision of
the Supreme Court rendered within five years after its ratification"); Sanford Levinson,
Some Reflections on the Rehabilitation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 73 (1989). (noting that the
Slaughter-House Cases "ruthlessly eviscerated the Clause of practically all operative
meaning"); Aviam Soifer, Protecting Posterity, 7 NOVA L. REV. 553, 557 (1982) (finding
that the Supreme Court "narrowed this protection.., to redundancy and oblivion"). The
only time prior to 1999 when a Supreme Court majority relied on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a state law was in Colgate
v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) (striking down a state tax provision). The interpretation of
the Clause adopted in that case was subsequently rejected in Madden v. Kentucky, 309
U.S. 83, 93 (1940).
Scholars continue to debate whether the Slaughter-House Cases accurately
reflected framers' intent. Compare Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities
Clause: 'Its Hour Come Round At Last'? 1972 WASH.U.L.Q. 405; JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Akhil Amar,
The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L. J. 1193 (1992); and
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986); with scholars who defend a
more restrictive interpretation including Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); RAOUL BERGER,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989). Robert Bork found
the meaning of the Clause so uncertain that he would dismiss it entirely. See ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166
(1990). For the view that intent of framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is
inherently indeterminate, see Timothy S. Bishop, Comment, The Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 142 (1984).
10. In a recent and comprehensive discussion of the incorporation debate, Akhil
Amar argues that various references to "privileges" or "immunities" made in the years
leading up to promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment "all were understood to
encompass, among other things, the protections of the federal Bill of Rights." AKHIL
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 167-68 (1998). But see Kenyon D. Bunch, The Original
Understanding of the Privileges and Imunities Clause: Michael Perry's Justification for
Judicial Activism or Robert Bork's Constitutional Inkblot, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L. J.
321 (2000) (arguing that a constitution-amending majority would not have subscribed to a
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function, except as an alternative to using the Supremacy Clause."'"
In the contemporary context, however, this statement assumes new
dimensions; with the Court's rulings that the Eleventh Amendment
constricted the Supremacy Clause, the value of an alternative to that
Clause now seems clear.
The thesis developed in the following pages is that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause authorizes Congress to abrogate states'
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment when acting to
enforce individual rights that Congress has been otherwise authorized
to protect. This proposition will be developed by tracing the
meaning of the phrase "privileges or immunities" through debates,
judicial opinions, and legislative action. It will begin by describing
references to this language made throughout the antebellum era.
Whether appearing as an element of constitutional analysis or in
contracts or treaties, all of those references are consistent with the
argument that generally applicable statutes are a likely source of
privileges or immunities. The context in which the Fourteenth
Amendment was promulgated and the statutes adopted to enforce
that Amendment underscore this conclusion.
The most direct and authoritative evidence that federal statutory
rights were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause comes from the Supreme Court, both in its earliest
interpretations of the clause and in its contemporary interpretation of
statutes that use these terms. The second major section of this article
will review those opinions. For all of the weaknesses of the Slaughter-
House Cases, Justice Miller's opinion for the Court in that case did
establish that privileges or immunities could be derived from federal
statutes. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions reinforced this
conclusion; in some contexts, federal statutes were essential to
proving that individual rights owed their existence to the federal
government. In other cases the Court has explicitly ruled that the
11. Todd Zubler, The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Time for Shapiro v.
Thompson to Take a Hike, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 893, 917 (1997) (citing EDWARD CORWIN,
THE CONSTITUrION OF THE UNITED STATES 965 (1953); David Currie, The Constitution
in the Supreme Court: Limitations on State Power 1865-1873, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 348
(1983)).
12. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
13. Compare United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (concluding that a
general right of assembly was not a right, privilege, or immunity of national citizenship)
with Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (finding that assembly to
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statute originally designed to enforce the Privileges or Immunities
Clause protects federal statutory rights.14
As demonstrated in the final section of this article, recent
Supreme Court decisions that bar congressional abrogation of the
Eleventh Amendment clash with the change in federalism that
accompanied ratification of the Civil War Amendments to the
Constitution. Serious application of the Slaughter-House Cases'
majority opinion and the cases that followed supports a conclusion
that Supreme Court decisions blocking enforcement of federal patent
rights,5 the Fair Labor Standards Act,6 or the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act 7 should be reversed. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court should not have rejected claims for monetary damages by
disabled citizens of the United States who seek equal access to state
government services and employment relationships. The Americans
with Disabilities Act established the privileges or immunities of those
citizens.
I. Background to a Search for the Meaning of Privileges or
Immunities
To understand the meaning that had been given to the phrase
"privileges or immunities" during the period preceding ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is helpful to examine two broad
questions. First, where had that language appeared in prior legal
texts and how was it being used? Second, what does the context in
which the Fourteenth Amendment was framed reveal about the
meaning of those terms? The discussion that follows offers answers
to these questions.
A review of these issues shows that, although frequent references
were made to rights, privileges, and immunities, precise meaning of
such terms was rarely discussed. The context in which the words were
used, however, adds substantially to the focused commentary on the
protect rights established by the National Labor Relations Act was a protected privilege
or immunity). For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 173-182.
14. See, e.g., Main v. Thiboutot, 488 U.S. 1 (1980) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
protect federal statutory rights). See generally infra text accompanying notes 205-227.
15. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
16. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
17. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
18. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001).
Winter 20011 PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
case of Corfield v. Coryell," which is so often used as a solitary guide.
The context in which the Civil War Amendments were framed also
helps to explain why the phrase "privileges or immunities" was used
in the Fourteenth Amendment. Both of these discussions add to the
evidence that federal statutes should be recognized as a source for
such rights.
A. Early History
Several purposes will be served by reviewing references to
"privileges" and "immunities" that preceded ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This review will illustrate the frequency of
these references; by 1869 the concept was neither new nor exotic. It
will also illustrate, both directly and by implication, that privileges or
immunities included a broad range of legal interests at least some of
which were based upon statutes. Finally, it will illustrate an
underlying theme of nondiscrimination: an assurance that those
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens will have equal
opportunities to claim the protection of the law.
Lawyers and lawmakers commonly referred to privileges and
immunities long before the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment.
American colonists sought the "essential Rights, Liberties, Privileges
and Immunities of the People of Great Britain" in the years leading
up to the Revolutionary War.' The various terms were used
interchangeably with no apparent concern for separate identification
or definition. Claims to the "rights, liberties and immunities of free"
English subjects were made by the First Continental Congress.2"
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation protected "all privileges
and immunities of free citizens of the several states" including "free
ingress and regress" as well as "all the privileges of trade and
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as
the inhabitants thereof respectively."'
Participants in the Constitutional Convention drew from these
sources when they chose the language used for Article IV, Section 2,
Clause 1 of the Constitution: "The Citizens of each State shall be
19. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (finding that collecting oysters was
not a privilege or immunity protected by Article IV, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution).
20. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 64 (1986) (quoting the
Massachusetts assembly).
21. Id. at 65.
22. Id.
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entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States." Despite the frequent references, however, its difficult to add
much insight into the meaning ascribed to these terms. Madison's
Notes from the Constitutional Convention record agreement to the
Clause without discussion.' In the only reference to privileges and
immunities contained in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton
addressed issues of equality, referring to the Clause as what may be
"esteemed the basis of the Union." He then explained:
[I]f it be a just principle that every government ought to possess
the means of executing its own provisions by its own authority it
will follow that in order to [assure] the inviolable maintenance
of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the
citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary
ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are
opposed to another State or its citizens.24
The only recorded federal case in the first half of the Nineteenth
Century that devoted a full page to discussing the meaning of
privileges and immunities was Corfield v. Coryell.' Given the paucity
of alternative resources, Corfield became the most common measure
of those terms. In that case, Justice Washington, acting as circuit
judge, ruled that New Jersey magistrates and constables could
lawfully seize a boat without becoming liable for trespass when that
boat was owned by a person from another state and was being used to
illegally gather oysters within New Jersey waters.
6
Corfield is commonly thought to stand for the proposition that
New Jersey was entitled to limit gathering of oysters to its own
citizens because oysters were part of the common property of the
state, therefore effectively owned by state citizens and subject to their
exclusive use. After asking whether citizens from other states had a
right to gather New Jersey oysters, Justice Washington concluded that
"it would ... be going quite too far to construe the grant of privileges
23. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
545(ed. 1966).
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
25. 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
26. It should be noted that the privileges and immunities issue in the case had little to
do with Justice Washington's final judgment. In the concluding section of his opinion,
Washington found that the owner of the boat in such circumstances had no right to bring a
trespass action when the boat had been leased to another individual who was using it at
the time of seizure. See id. at 555. The person who was actually using the boat at the time
had "escaped under an apprehension of being sued by a person living at Leesburg, to
whom he was indebted." Id. at 547. The case was therefore dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds, which had nothing to do with privileges and immunities; Justice Washington's
discussion of that issue was nothing more than dictum.
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and immunities of citizens, as amounting to a grant of a co-tenancy in
the common property of the state, to the citizens of all the other
states."27
Actually, however, the New Jersey laws were not nearly as
discriminatory as Justice Washington's opinion implied. At the time
Corfield's boat was seized, everyone was barred from raking for
oysters whether or not they were New Jersey residents. The key
distinction between residents and non-residents was that the boats of
the latter could be seized and sold; this distinction could be easily
understood in the context in which maintaining jurisdiction over non-
residents for purposes of exacting fines or penalties other than seizure
would have been difficult. The holding in Corfield merely upheld this
statutory scheme.
Justice Washington made clear in his opinion that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV did not require absolute equality
of citizens and non-citizens. A state could have ownership interests
that inured to the benefit of its residents, and only when state
regulations addressed interests "which [were], in their nature,
fundamental" did the Privileges and Immunities Clause attach.' But
Justice Washington's account of such interests was far from
illuminating. It included "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety,, 29 but subjected these rights to "such
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good
of the whole."'3 Washington also identified the right to pursue a trade
or profession, to be protected by habeas corpus, and to be exempt
"from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens
of the state."'" In reaching these conclusions, he rejected the
proposition that "citizens of the several states are permitted to
participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of
any other particular state, merely upon the ground that they are
enjoyed by those citizens."3 2
Much of the difficulty in construing Justice Washington's opinion
results from subsequent attempts to apply references made in a
common law era and at a time when principles of natural law were
27. Id. at 552.
28. Id. at 551.
29. Id. at 551-52.




more readily accepted. In contemporary parlance, Washington's
opinion left room for two alternative conceptions of the rights that he
embraced. By denoting his approach as a search for "fundamental"
rights, distinct from rights which are exclusively those of state citizens
and presumably less fundamental, his opinion can be cited as an
argument for a "natural rights" view of privileges and immunities.'
This natural rights element of the case became a lightning rod for
subsequent arguments over the scope of the concept of privileges and
immunities, and was subsequently rejected by the courts.'
A second element of Justice Washington's opinion, based upon a
principle of equal treatment, has been less controversial and has
received correspondingly less attention. Washington's opinion can be
understood as a search for those rights that should be shared equally,
without additional reference to their nature or importance. Building
from this premise, the term "fundamental" can be understood as a
reference to rights that are basic and held by all, as distinguished from
rights enjoyed by a select segment of the society or reserved only to
those with unique citizenship status. Although the oblique reference
to natural rights called for speculation regarding the inherent
substantive rights that all states must protect regardless of legislative
action, the emphasis on equality allowed for more concrete
application and less speculative judicial decision-making. In a world
in which statutes and constitutions have generally replaced common
law and natural rights, it is easier to understand that judges have the
role of deciding which of the rights and privileges extended to state
citizens must also be extended to citizens of other states. In this
context, judges need not decide whether state citizens have inherent
rights regardless of state recognition. Based upon this generally
prevailing interpretation, the role of the judge is not to conjure
"fundamental rights," but rather to assure equal application of
recognized privileges and immunities to outsiders. For example,
courts are not asked to determine whether or not states should be
allowed to tax. Instead, the central question is whether state taxes
and regulations apply in a fair and non-discriminatory manner to
citizens both inside and outside of the forum state. State government
may prescribe restraints "for the general good of the whole";3 by
33. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 24 (1988).
34. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78; Downham v. Alexandria, 77 U.S. 173
(1869); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869).
35. Corfield, 6 Fed. Cas. at 552.
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implication, they are barred only when those restraints discriminate
unfairly against non-residents.
This is not to say that courts could apply the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, without making
substantive judgments. As with all procedural issues, there continues
to be an underlying need to identify those cases to which equal
treatment of non-residents should apply. That inquiry, however, need
not be seen as an open-ended search for substantive rights."
At the time when the Fourteenth Amendment was promulgated,
the judicial record supporting the view that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV protected inherent fundamental
rights did not extend far beyond the limited references described
above. More extensive support existed for the alternative, albeit
complementary view that, at a minimum, protection of privileges or
immunities implied a right to invoke a substantial range of existing
statutory or common law protections in order to assure equality of
treatment. In case after case, whether the phrase "privileges and
immunities" appeared in Article IV of the Constitution or in treaties,
statutes or contracts, its meaning included some measure of equal
application of existing law. For example, the clause in Article I,
Section 8, of the Constitution declaring that "all duties, imposts, and
excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States" had been
interpreted by the Supreme Court as:
a prohibition against granting privileges or immunities to
vessels entering or clearing from the ports of one State over
those of another.... [T]hese privileges and immunities,
whatever they may be in the judgment of congress, shall be
common and equal in all the ports of the several States:
In other words, privileges or immunities of United States citizens
were to be established by national legislation.
A handful of cases illustrate how the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV was commonly used to equalize statutory rights.
In Wheaton v. Peters,'s counsel argued:
The constitution, by this provision, designed to make, and does
in fact make us one nation, living under the same laws. It is
36. The experience of the Supreme Court when it rejected privileges or immunities
protection in the Slaughter-House Cases illustrates this distinction. See infra at text
accompanying notes 115-143.
37. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 435 (1855)
(concluding that Congress had power to authorize continued use of a bridge that courts
previously found to have impeded navigation).
38. 33 U.S. 591 (1834) (addressing copyright claims of publishers of the U.S. Reports).
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designed to give to all the citizens of the United States... the
benefit of all the laws of all the states, and the privileges
conferred by them. Under this provision, a citizen of New York
has all the privileges of the laws of Pennsylvania whatever they
may be.3
In an 1858 circuit court decision, the court rejected the
proposition that a river could be "made a highway only for citizens of
Pennsylvania. 4' The circuit court explained that, pursuant to Article
IV, Section 2 of the Constitution:
The complainants have a right to hold land in Pennsylvania, to
erect mills and use the public highways by land or water, as
freely as citizens of Pennsylvania, and have, moreover, a right
to sue a citizen of Pennsylvania, or a corporation, the members
of which are presumed to be citizens of Pennsylvania, in this
court.'
In a Supreme Court decision interpreting the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV during the same time period as
Fourteenth Amendment ratification debates, the Court emphasized
"the object of the clause.., to place the citizens of each State upon
the same footing with citizens of other States."'42 The Court
concluded that corporations were not included within the term
citizens, and that out-of-state insurance companies were therefore not
entitled to protection from Article IV.4 Justice Field's rationale was
that the advantages of corporate status achieved in one state should
not be automatically recognized and protected in all other states. As
he explained: "The corporation being the mere creation of local law,
can have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty
where created."' As a result, Justice Field concluded that special
privileges flowing from corporate status were not transferrable from
one state to another. In the same opinion the Court concluded that
insurance contracts were not "articles of commerce" and that
discrimination against foreign insurance companies did not interfere
with congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. Language
in Justice Field's opinion was generally viewed as having limited the
scope of privileges and immunities to those legal and constitutional
39. Id. at 606.
40. Mason v. Boom Co., 16 F. Cas. 1012,1013 (W.D. Penn. 1858) (No. 9,232).
41. Id.
42. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168,180 (1868).
43. Id. at 183.
44. Id. at 181.
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rights accorded by the state of sojourn."
Other contexts further illustrate how the concept of privileges
and immunities was understood. In 1828, the Supreme Court was
asked to review salvage claims that had been litigated in the
territorial courts of Florida. To reach that issue, Chief Justice
Marshall construed the 1819 treaty by which Spain ceded the territory
of Florida to the United States, assuring Florida residents "the
enjoyment of the privileges, rights and immunities of the citizens of
the United States."46  But, that clause did not give the Florida
inhabitants any rights to participate in political institutions or
activities. As a result, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that
admiralty claims involving those Florida residents could be resolved
by courts which lacked Article III stature. Political rights were thus
distinguished from other rights that arose under the Constitution and
laws of the United States. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion did not
specifically address the issue, but allowed for the implication that the
phrase privileges and immunities referred to assurances of non-
discrimination as to general statutory provisions enacted by Congress.
It distinguished generally applicable legislation from that which only
pertained to members of the political community of the state.
In United States v. Webster,47 the district court considered
whether a quartermaster should be paid for unusual services
rendered. In concluding that repayment would not be ordered when
the services at issue were not payable pursuant to either statute or
usages and custom, the Court referred to the latter as a source for
definition of privileges and immunities.'
In numerous other cases, the phrase "privileges and immunities"
appeared as virtual boiler-plate. In most instances, the message
appeared clear: parties to a contract or agreement would be protected
by the same laws or rules that protect the general population. For
example, the phrase often appeared in admiralty cases. In one such
case, the relationship between a ship's officer and a seaman was
contrasted with that of parent and child or master and apprentice on
grounds that seamen were "entitled to the privileges and immunities
of citizens in all respects other than in their qualified subjection to the
45. See CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONsTITUTIoNAL LAW § 9.18 (1st ed.
1969).
46. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828).
47. 28 F. Cas. 509 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 16,657).
48. See id. at 516.
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discipline on ship-board."49  Based on that distinction, the district
court concluded that a ship's master was liable for damages when he
ordered flogging without hearing the seaman's reason for disobeying
an order.
In Smith v. Hunter,-5 the Supreme Court discussed the tax status
of land granted by Congress for formation of Miami University of
Ohio. Although the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case, it noted that terms of incorporation for the University
protected "all the privileges and immunities granted to the lessees of
the university by the several acts and laws of the State." This phrase
was typical of the routine language used at the time to assure the
entity whose rights were protected that it would not be discriminated
against by the state. Significantly, the phrase "privileges and
immunities" was consistently used as a reference to statutes having
general application.
Yet, the most striking feature of the pre-Civil War record is the
extent to which references to privileges and immunities chronicled
the sordid history of slavery. Most notorious was the case in which
the Supreme Court asked whether Dred Scott,
whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as
slaves, [c]ould become a member of the political community
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and
privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the
citizen.
The Court concluded that Scott was not entitled to those rights
and therefore could not be made free as a matter of federal law. The
extremes to which the sinister meaning of Dred Scott could be carried
were illustrated in subsequent decisions by the Mississippi Supreme
Court, holding that all African-Americans, whether slave or free,
were "infidels" and "articles of merchandise," therefore incapable of
becoming residents of the state or inheriting property.52
In the case of The Amistad, the Court examined "the privileges,
49. Sheridan v. Furbur, 21 F. Cas. 1266, 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1834) (No. 12,761).
50. 48 U.S. 738,741 (1849).
51. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,403 (1856).
52. Heirn v. Bridault, 37 Miss. 209, 224-26 (1859). See also Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss.
235 (1859). Such racist attitudes were not confined to the southern states. A Connecticut
statute barred out-of-state African-Americans from attending unincorporated Connecticut
schools. The Connecticut Supreme Court avoided questions about whether that statute
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV by narrowly construing the
statute so that it did not apply to the defendants who had been charged with violating the
law. See Crandall v. Connecticut, 10 Conn. 339 (1834).
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and immunities, and rights belonging to bona fide subjects of Spain,
under our treaties or laws .... , The Court concluded that free
Africans aboard the ship were entitled to as much respect as Spanish
subjects. In Dred Scott, privileges and immunities were synonymous
with those fundamental liberty interests protected by the Constitution
and federal law establishing freedom from slavery. In The Amistad,
the context of the reference makes it clear that privileges and
immunities had been created by the treaties and laws enacted by
Congress.
State law also became the point of reference for determining the
legal status of former slaves or their captors. In one example, slavery
was reduced to claims of a contract for service. "The presumption of
freedom attaches to every resident of a free state, without regard to
color; and, on the same principle in a slave state, every colored man is
presumed to be a slave."'  The Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV was cited as a basis for federal authority to enforce this
presumption.5 In United States v. Scott, the district court noted that
when the Constitution was ratified, Massachusetts forced all African-
Americans from other states who lacked a certificate of citizenship to
be imprisoned by hard labor, punished by whipping and ordered out
of the state. 6 The exception for those who had a certificate of
citizenship was explained by reference to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV.'
In yet another case, a circuit court cited the Second Amendment
right to bear arms, in combination with the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, to provide justification for a New Jersey slave owner who
entered Pennsylvania and used force to claim an alleged fugitive
slave. 8 The court described the slave owner "[a]s the owner of
property, which he had a perfect right to possess, protect, and take
away; as a citizen of a sister state, entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of any other states. . . ."'9 In Costin v.
53. 40 U.S. 518, 595 (1841) (freeing slaves who had revolted while being transported
to Cuba).
54. Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335,340 (D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583).
55. See id. at 338.
56. 27 F. Cas. 990, 995 (D. Mass. 1851) (No. 16,240). Note, the Scott case also upheld
a congressional act which "commandeered" state officials by ordering them to assist in the
seizure of fugitive slaves. Id. Cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
57. See Scott, 27 F. Cas. at 995.
58. See Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840,850 (E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 17,416).
59. Id. at 855.
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Washington,6° the D.C. Circuit Court found that the Constitution did
not guarantee "equal rights to all citizens of the United States, in the
several states." The Court emphasized the limited scope of Article
IV, noting that "[a] citizen of one state coming into another state, can
claim only those privileges and immunities which belong to citizens of
the latter state., 61 Based on this distinction, the Court leapt to the
conclusion that laws imposing constraints and penalties on all
"persons of color" would not violate the Constitution.62 This case and
others like it from the antebellum period demonstrate that slavery
and racism had been frequently intertwined with the concept of
privileges and immunities; it was the instrument by which the
authority of slave owners was enforced and the rights of slaves were
denied.
Prior to 1869, references to privileges and immunities fell short
of establishing a single, coherent meaning for that phrase. The early
cases do not disprove the theory that references to privileges or
immunities were meant to embody fundamental and inherent
constitutional rights. When viewed as a whole, however, they
demonstrate that privileges or immunities could be based upon
statutory claims, and that one primary reason for protecting those
interests was to assure equal treatment. Not all statutory interests
warranted this treatment. The line distinguishing rights of state
citizens from rights of those who lacked state citizenship but whose
privileges and immunities were protected was rarely discussed and
remained amorphous.
B. Development of the Fourteenth Amendment
One of the enduring mysteries surrounding the Fourteenth
Amendment, which tends to be attached in particular to debates
about whether it incorporated the Bill of Rights, is why the
Amendment's text did not contain a more clearly defined statement
of its scope. Advocates of incorporation are asked, if fundamental
principles of the Bill of Rights were to be applied to the states, why
60. 6 F. Cas. 612 (D. D.C. 1821)(No. 3,266).
61. Id. at 613-14. But see The Cynosure, 6 F. Cas. 1102, 1103 (D. Mass. 1844) (No.
3,529). The Cynosure Court found that the Commerce Clause was violated by a
prohibition against persons of color who were seamen on vessels using the ports of
Louisiana, noting that "if one color may be excluded, any other may ...." Id The Court
did not reach the question of whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause also protected
the seaman because there was no proof that he was a citizen of any state. See id.
62. Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 614
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didn't framers of the Amendment say so in no uncertain terms?' The
following analysis suggests that, at a minimum, the Fourteenth
Amendment erased doubts regarding enforcement of federal statutes
to assure protection of the privileges and immunities of all United
States citizens.
If, in 1867, one looked to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV as a point for comparison, it would have been obvious that
the practical scope of privileges or immunities depended, at least in
part, on the context of the litigation and the underlying law that
pertained. When Justice Washington wrote his opinion in Corfield v.
Coryell, he could not reasonably have anticipated all of the state laws
governing individual status or behavior that necessitated equal
treatment of citizens from other states. He preferred to speak in
generalities, and he explicitly refused to identify a comprehensive list
of privileges or immunities that might qualify for protection.'
Decisions about whether courts should mandate equality of treatment
must be made on a case-by-case basis as government regulations
addressed new situations, rather than by reference to a rigid list or a
limited conception of its application. When the claim is perceived in
these terms, the reasons for leaving "privileges and immunities"
indefinite seem obvious, especially when their meaning depended in
part upon the legitimate scope of future legislative acts.
Furthermore, whereas certain privileges or immunities may be
inherent and therefore enforceable whether or not states have
enacted relevant and related legislation, other privileges or
immunities came into existence only as a result of legislation. For
example, rights to due process preceding a criminal conviction may be
fundamental privileges or immunities that presumably existed for all
state citizens and that extended to visiting citizens from other states
by reason of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. On
the other hand, there may not have been an inherent right to engage
in commercial fishing; but if state legislation licensed state residents
to engage in that vocation, that state had to extend the same right to
citizens of other states, again by reason of Article IV. Because of this
two-tiered structure, including more than just inherent rights (or
rights derived from natural law), the substance of "privileges or
immunities" remained open-ended.
This interpretation, recognizing that existence of some privileges
or immunities depended upon legislative action, explains why
63. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
64. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
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participants in the Fourteenth Amendment ratification debate could
claim that no "new" rights were being created.5 The federal
government did not gain broad authority to enact new legislation.
Enforcement powers of Congress authorized by Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment only extended to legislation authorized by
the enumerated powers of Congress, legislation to enforce inherent
rights of state and/or United States citizens, and legislation to enforce
principles of due process and equality in the post-slavery context. If
this was the conception of the Fourteenth Amendment existing in the
late 1860's, then it is understandable that further enumeration or
references to incorporation would not have been made. The context
within which the Fourteenth Amendment was promulgated illustrates
the legitimacy of this framework.
Much of the debate regarding the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause has focused on meaning
that can be derived from the ratification debates, but arguments
taken from the debates fail to provide a complete or adequate context
for understanding the amendments. The inherent difficulty in
attempting to draw interpretations from statements made during a
debate is easily illustrated. Individual scholars have found substantial
evidence to support diametrically opposing views. Compare, for
example, Raoul Berger's view of the framers' "vastly preponderant
view that they were merely incorporating the limited provisions of the
Civil Rights Act"' with the argument of Henry Commager that "the
rights, privileges and immunities to be protected.., were the whole
spectrum of rights embraced in such phrases as 'natural rights,'
'fundamental rights,' 'the rights of man,' 'God-given rights' and so
forth.... ,,67
A persuasive argument can be made that there was no majority
view, let alone a consensus, regarding the meaning of privileges or
immunities at the time the clause was inserted into the Constitution.'
At the very least, a narrow focus on the ratification debates is
65. See, e.g. ALFRED AvINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DEBATES 230
(1967) (quoting Senator Poland).
66. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 146 (1977).
67. HENRY COMMAGER, Historical Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, IN
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 23-24 (B. Schwarz ed. 1970).
68. This conclusion is consistent with the diversity of views that continues to be
reflected in debates regarding this issue. See Bishop, supra note 9, at 190. Robert Bork
concludes that meaning of the Privileges of Immunities Clause cannot be ascertained, and
therefore the Clause should have no more meaning than an "ink blot." BORK supra note
9, at 166.
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unlikely to yield clear or coherent answers to questions about the
intended scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Conflicting comments made in the heat of debate may ini
isolation seem inscrutable and have given rise to competing theories
about legislative intent. A clearer picture emerges from the broader
social and political context within which promulgation and ratification
took place. From that context one can demonstrate three underlying
concerns which inspired and motivated advocates of the amendments.
One of those can be expressed in terms of emphasis on fundamental
rights; framers understood the need to assure that all citizens would
be free to express themselves without government interference and to
seek refuge in the law when threatened by government persecution.
A second concern was for the elimination of invidious discrimination,
not only in the form of slavery (a concern that had been addressed in
narrower terms by the Thirteenth Amendment), but in broader
manifestations as well. A third concern had to do with changing the
relationship between state and federal governments to assure that
Congress would be empowered to protect the rights of United States
citizens. All three of these concerns were reflected in the language of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
In his recent book, Professor Akhil Amar explained that the
context in which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted
underscored the importance of protecting fundamental rights." In
years leading up to the Civil War, states had banned "incendiary"
publications." Thus, former slaves were not alone in needing
protection from state governments. Participants in the abolitionist
movement understood from personal experiences why broader
protection was needed. Justice Miller apparently did not appreciate
this concern when he wrote in 1872 that former slaves were the only
intended beneficiaries of the Fourteenth Amendment,' but
Republicans in Congress undoubtedly understood the need to protect
fundamental liberties such as the freedoms of speech or press from
state as well as federal intrusion. It would be difficult to imagine that
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would not have intended to
protect these interests from state interference. The context in which
the ratification debate took place therefore lends support to the thesis
69. See NELSON, supra note 33, at 4 (finding that "[h]istorical scholarship on the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is now at an impasse").
70. See AMAR, supra note 10, at 137-162.
71. Id. at 159.
72. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,71 (1872).
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that framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to incorporate
those protections, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause could
logically be understood as a source for that incorporation. It makes
more sense than relying upon the Due Process Clause,73 and it is not
inconsistent with references to privileges and immunities made by
prior generations.
Arguments made during the ratification debate, however, also
illustrate the point that privileges or immunities included something
more than the list of fundamental rights of the first eight
amendments. Justice Washington's views expressed in Corfield v.
Coryell were cited for this proposition by Senator Jacob Howard who
offered the most comprehensive analysis of this issue rendered to the
Senate. After quoting Corfield at length, Senator Howard noted that
"[t]o these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-for
they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and
precise nature-to these should be added the personal rights
guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments .... "74
A non-discrimination theme can also be easily demonstrated by
the context in which the Fourteenth Amendment arose. Opposition
to slavery was a starting point for understanding this concern, and
those who framed the Fourteenth Amendment did so in part out of
fear that the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, had
not gone far enough to authorize federal legislation that would be
needed to secure freedom from invidious discrimination. Denial of
privileges and immunities had been a manifestation of slavery, but the
Thirteenth Amendment failed to adequately assure that all persons
were entitled to those privileges and immunities that states had
previously reserved for slave owners and others of their race.
The notion that principles of equality were of central concern to
those who framed the Fourteenth Amendment is not debatable.
Some would argue, however, that this concern was adequately
addressed by the Equal Protection Clause and did not require
reinforcement. Historical use of the terms privileges and immunities,
however, illustrates that those terms were also intended at least in
part to address questions about equal application of the law.
Whereas the Equal Protection Clause focused on concerns about
discriminatory state law, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment assured equality of rights and interests
73. See ELY, supra note 9, at 14-30.
74. 39th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. GLOBE 813, 1064-65 (1866); See AMAR, supra note
10, at 185-86.
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otherwise established by the Constitution or laws of the federal
government.
A third theme derived from understanding the pre-Civil War
context dealt with the need to shift the federal balance, giving
Congress unquestioned authority to protect individuals from state
governments. In its most meaningful sense, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was about federalism.75 It was intended to resolve,
once and for all, debates that had raged around claims of state and
federal sovereignty. This third theme is one that contemporary
Supreme Court Justices seem to have forgotten.
John C. Calhoun and other southern leaders had construed state
sovereignty to include final authority to nullify federal law when state
courts determined that the national government had acted
unconstitutionally.76 Calhoun's theory was carried beyond mere
rhetoric when the South Carolina legislature met in special session to
nullify the Tariff of 1832; its action led to a standoff with President
Andrew Jackson and eventually to a compromise lowering import
duties to levels that were more acceptable to South Carolina.' In
addition to this example, there were many instances in which other
states, acting through their courts, nullified federal law.' In those
cases, Congress generally lacked the power needed to effectively
protect individual citizens from state nullification. The Privileges or
Immunities Clause redressed that balance of power. 9
As explained by Professor Robert Kaczorowski, "Because
Northern Republicans needed to preserve their Civil War victory
over state sovereignty and slavery, they established in law the
primacy of United States citizenship and with it the primacy of
Congress's authority to secure the rights of American citizens. '
Their instrument for achieving this aim was the Privileges or
75. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the
Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 877 (1986).
76. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT 20-38 (C. Gordon Post
ed. 1953). See generally NELSON, supra note 33, at 33.
77. See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION
CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816-1836, p. 260-97 (1965).
78. See NELSON, supra note 33, at 27. In addition to the southern efforts to nullify
federal law, there were also many instances in which northern judges had used the same
concept of state sovereignty to advance their interests. See, e.g., Abelman v. Booth, 62
U.S. 506 (1859) (holding that Wisconsin state judges could not block federal enforcement
of fugitive slave laws).
79. 39th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. GLOBE 2542 (1865-66). See also, Fairman, supra
note 9, at 51-53.
80. Kaczorowski, supra note 75.
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Immunities Clause. That Clause assured that Congress would be able
to protect the basic privileges of all citizens free from state resistance
or interference; in other words, privileges or immunities established
by Congress would be protected in all states.
Congressman John Bingham, who authored the first clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, had strong opinions about the need to
reinforce federal authority. He expressed those views in his 1859
speech in opposition to the admission of Oregon because of
provisions in that state's constitution that would have permanently
barred African-Americans from holding real estate or making
contracts.8' Bingham explained both his conception of privileges and
immunities and the need he felt for additional federal authority to
protect those interests.8 He equated the privileges and immunities of
Article IV with an entitlement to "the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States in the several States,"' 3 and he
interpreted that phrase as barring any states from allowing "strong
citizens [to] deprive the weak citizens of their rights, natural or
political."'' In Bingham's view, the Supremacy Clause, even without
the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteed that the Constitution and
laws of the United States would bar states from violating this concept
of privileges and immunities.' Having experienced the debate
surrounding Oregon's constitution, however, Bingham understood
that his views regarding the Supremacy Clause needed reinforcement.
Congressman Bingham's concern for reinforcing his conception
of privileges and immunities served as a motivating force at the time
when he led the drive towards ratification. In his final speech to the
House of Representatives in favor of adoption, he explained the need
for the Privileges or Immunities Clause in terms of "the right to bear
true allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States."'"
For further explanation and emphasis, he referred to South Carolina's
efforts to nullify the revenue laws of the United States.' The first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment protected citizens from future
81. See John Bingham, The Constitution of the United States and the Proslavery
Provisions of the 1857 Oregon Constitution, 35th CONG., 2nd Sess., Cong. Globe vol. 1,
1858-59, reprinted in JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 332 (1965).
82. See id.
83. Id. at 333.
84. Id. at 332.
85. See id.
86. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. CONG. GLOBE 2542 (1865-66).
87. See id.
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state efforts to nullify the laws of the United States. All of Congress
must have understood this reference, and also understood that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause reestablished federal supremacy.
In his remarks on "The Reconstruction Amendment,"
Representative Jehu Baker of Illinois added: "What business is it of
any State to do the things here forbidden? to rob the American
citizen of rights thrown around him by the supreme law of the
land?"" Understood in context, Baker was reiterating the view that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause would reinforce federal
supremacy law against competing claims of state sovereignty.
Protection for fundamental rights, non-discrimination principles,
and changes in federal power were all themes running through the
ratification debates, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause was well
suited to address them. The fundamental rights component could be
protected directly by the courts through their articulation of inherent
principles derived directly from the Constitution. Other interests
embodied in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, however, were
meaningful only in the context of federal statutes. Much like the
antebellum references to privileges or immunities, this implies a two-
tiered approach; privileges or immunities were in part inherent and
immutable, and also, in part, creations and creatures of Congress.
A two-tiered approach to understanding privileges or immunities
is not new. Frequent references to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of Article IV as a model for the language contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment make complete sense when understood as
embracing common law and statutory rights in addition to those
derived from constitutional principles or from the natural law." The
prime difficulty with this argument was that, when seen as giving
Congress authority to address common law issues that were the
traditional realm of state law, it shifted more power to the central
government than politicians of that era would have accepted." One
88. 39th Cong. 1st Sess., CONG. GLOBE 3683 (1865-66), App. 255. See Fairman, supra
note 9.
89. Congressman Bingham identified the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Article
IV as his model. 39th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. GLOBE part 2, 1033-34 (1866). Members of
Congress repeatedly referred to Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield, interpreting that
clause. See generally BERNARD H. SIEGAN, SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION 46-56
(1987).
90. See EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869 29-42 (1990). Note, however, that at the time when the Fourteenth
Amendment was added to the Constitution, federal courts, as distinct from Congress,
played a substantial role in developing a federal common law. That role did not change
until the Supreme Court decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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solution to this problem was to limit federal protection of state
generated common law rights to instances of irrational discrimination
in the protection of those rights.9' Several scholars have argued for
recognition of a "two-tiered" interpretation of privileges or
immunities, embracing core protection of fundamental rights while
also including a non-discrimination principle that would apply to
common law or state statutory rights. The latter concept, however,
adds little to what we currently understand to be the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
An alternative, two-tiered approach seems more viable and more
consistent with traditions and context. In addition to protecting
fundamental rights included within the Bill of Rights, the Privileges
or Immunities Clause also protects rights established by federal
statutory law that are of the same nature as those traditionally
recognized as privileges or immunities derived from common law,
statutes, or treaties. Whereas the substantive meaning of the former
would be enduring, the scope of the latter would be determined by
reference to federal law.
This is not to suggest that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
could be construed as an empty vessel to be filled at will by a future
Congress. As noted above, framers of the Civil War Amendments
were too suspicious of government authority to agree that power to
enforce the Privileges or Immunities Clause opened a door to
Congress to enact legislation creating new privileges or immunities.
Their fear of expansive government power, however, did not preclude
interpreting privileges or immunities to include future acts of
Congress made within its legitimate sphere of authority. When the
federal government acts to establish contract rights, property rights,
or employment rights, Congress possesses the authority to prevent
state interference with those privileges or immunities.'
91. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L.J. 1385 (1992).
92. JACOBUS TENBROECK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 189-90 (Collier, 1965) (1951); Earl
M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT.
305, 323 (1988). As this approach was explained by Akhil Amar, the decision about
whether a given right was truly fundamental at a given time and place could thus be based
upon either inscription in an enduring bill of rights or legislation that a present
government chose to extend to its most favored citizens. This second category of rights
would receive antidiscrimination protection rather than fundamental rights protection.
AMAR, supra note 10, at 179.
93. For example, when Congress exercised its power to regulate federal property by
establishing homestead rights, it also created privileges or immunities for its citizens. See
United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
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This reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is also
consistent with the textual limit of its application to "citizens" rather
than to "all persons." The issue stemming from Dred Scott was
whether citizens could be denied privileges or immunities." At that
time and for generations thereafter, it was understood that states
might restrict property or employment rights of aliens.' Treaties that
protected the rights, privileges or immunities of inhabitants of new
U.S.' territories meant that those inhabitants were to be treated more
like citizens than aliens. Furthermore, privileges or immunities
entailed a kind of ownership interest that may not have been
appropriate for non-residents. In the example of homestead rights,
Congress legitimately limited enjoyment of those rights to citizens of
the United States. Thus, the fact that privileges or immunities
protections extended only to citizens coincided with the
nondiscrimination element of that clause identified in the preceding
discussion.
The idea that some federal law would embrace privileges or
immunities was firmly rooted at the time when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified. Prior southern resistance to federal law
had also illustrated the need to reinforce federal supremacy. By the
late 1860's, Congress had already enacted civil rights statutes
intended to protect privileges and immunities, and the Constitution
was amended in part to establish federal authority to enforce those
laws.
C. Civil Rights Statutes
As illustrated in the preceding discussion, parallel concerns for
fundamental rights, equal treatment, and federal authority motivated
Congress at the time it promulgated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Legislation passed in the years that immediately preceded or followed
ratification of that Amendment illustrated the same range of interests
and need for statutory as well as constitutional reinforcement. Civil
rights legislation from the Reconstruction Era provides primary
evidence of the meaning intended for the Privileges or Immunities
94. 60 U.S. at 403.
95. While some state limits on employment opportunities of aliens were invalidated in
1915, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), alien status was not identified as a "suspect
category" that constrained discriminatory state legislation until 1971. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
96. See AMAR, supra note 10, at 167-68 (identifying treaties with France, Spain,
Mexico and the Stockbridge and Wyandott Tribes protecting the inhabitants of new




In 1866, the initial southern state reaction to the end of slavery
was an attempt to replicate it through discriminatory codes that
denied African-Americans many of the basic rights accorded to
European-Americans. Blacks could not rent or own houses, could
not meet after dark without permission of the police, and in some
cases could not even pass through a local parish without a permit.' In
response, Congress proposed the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, which was
a precursor to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.98 Introduced on
January 5, 1866, the bill provided that "whenever any state formerly
in rebellion denied on account of color the civil rights and immunities
belonging to white persons, including the rights to contract, sue, give
evidence, take, hold and convey property, and enjoy the equal benefit
of laws for the security of person and estate, the President has a duty
to extend military protection to the persons affected by such
discrimination."" Although the Freedman's Bureau Act was vetoed
by President Johnson, comparable language, protecting the same
litany of rights, became the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, which
was passed over Johnson's veto."°  That act demonstrated a
commitment to the nondiscrimination principles motivating
legislators during that era. 0' It emphasized the right of all citizens "in
every State and Territory in the United States" to make contracts
"and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property.)'002
The jurisdictional provisions of the 1866 Act made clear that a
major congressional concern at the time was to provide a federal
forum for victims of discriminatory action within the southern states.
Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act provided concurrent district and
circuit court jurisdiction "of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting
persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial
tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights
97. See I. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 279-81 (1960).
98. See MALTZ, supra note 90, at 48-49.
99. See 39th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. GLOBE 6 (1865-66).
100. See 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
101. Raoul Berger mistakenly argues that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
mirrors the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and that the scope of that act was
limited to outlawing race discrimination. BERGER, supra note 9, at 22. Akhil Amar
demonstrates the fallacy of Berger's argument, but does not dispute existence of a
nondiscrimination principle that is embraced by both the Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment. AMAR supra note 10, at 193-97.
102. See AMAR supra note 10, at 178.
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secured to them" by the first section of the Act.'O°
The 1866 Acts were meant to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment, but concerns were expressed about whether the
Thirteenth Amendment offered adequate authority for those laws.
As a result, after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870, which substantially
restated the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
maintained provisions for concurrent district and circuit court
jurisdiction, and also made it a crime to conspire to deny any person
of "any right or privilege granted or secured... by the Constitution
or laws of the United States."
In a continuing effort to define and extend protection derived
from the Civil War Amendments, Congress added the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. Section one of that act provided redress for deprivations
of rights under color of state law.1" The new civil remedy of the 1871
Act encompassed deprivations of "any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States."1 °"
Much has been made of the fact that this language only protected
privileges or immunities derived from the Constitution, rather than
the broader inclusion of statutory rights that had been explicitly
recognized under the conspiracy statute of 1870.1(6 It is possible,
however, that the change in language created a distinction without a
difference. When viewed in terms of the Supremacy Clause, all
federal statutory rights could be properly understood as having been
secured by the Constitution; state laws that conflict with or are
preempted by federal law are commonly deemed unconstitutional7
103. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
104. 16 Stat. 433 (1871).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979) (ruling
that federal court jurisdiction did not encompass claims that state welfare regulations
conflicted with the Social Security Act).
107. Similar analysis, that rights "secured by the Constitution" included those
protected by the Supremacy Clause, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Chapman. Id.
at 613-15; see also Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 126-27 (1965). The reasoning
employed by the Court in those cases, however, points towards the opposite conclusion
when applied to the Civil Rights Act of 1871. In Chapman, the Court noted that the
jurisdictional grant codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1343 distinguished between constitutional
claims and rights secured by an Act of Congress. Justice Stevens reasoned that these
separate provisions would not have been made if constitutional claims were meant to have
included those derived from the Supremacy Clause. The Civil Rights Act of 1871,
however, did not make any separate provision for rights protected by federal law, and in
that context it makes more sense to interpret the reference to rights, privileges and
immunities secured by the Constitution broadly. For a broad interpretation, see Maine v.
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Framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 may well have seen reference
to "laws of the United States" as redundant to secure Constitutional
rights.
Whatever limit in the scope of civil rights protection may have
been implied from the omission of reference to federal laws was
removed three years later when Congress accepted a general
consolidation of the federal laws in which language from the 1871
Civil Rights Act was broadened to include any "rights, privileges, or
immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.""l°a This change was made in the context of federal
code revisions that were not intended to have been substantive.
Drafters of the revision, however, were undoubtedly aware of the
difference in language that had emerged in the 1870 and 1871 acts,
and chose language in 1874 that extended the more inclusive 1870
language to both the conspiracy statute and the civil remedy
provision.
Alteration in the language of the Civil Rights laws was consistent
with contemporaneous judicial explanations that privileges or
immunities could be established either by the text of the Constitution
or by statute. In other words, the commonly accepted and,
therefore, unremarkable view of the time was privileges or
immunities could be established through federal statutes. If civil
rights laws were to offer protection paralleling that expectation, then
remedies should be available for deprivation of either Constitutional
or statutory rights. °
Additional evidence that members of Congress who participated
in framing the Fourteenth Amendment understood that privileges or
immunities could be established by federal law can be found in the
debate that accompanied the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
That Act, which prohibited discrimination in inns, theaters, common
carriers, and other forms of public accommodations, began its course
in 1870. Nearly half of the senators and a significant number of the
representatives who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment also
participated in the debate leading up to passage of the Act.' During
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to include rights secured by
federal statutes). For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 114-227.
108. § 5510 of the 1874 Revised Statutes (emphasis added).
109. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,79 (1873).
110. References to privileges or immunities established by federal statutory law, found
in both the Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Revised Statutes of 1874, have survived to
the present day in the form of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1983.
111. Alfred Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875: Some Reflected Light on the
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initial years of the debate, several of the bill's sponsors made it clear
that they relied upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as their authority for taking such action.112
Debate on that bill, however, illustrated the uncertain and
inconsistent views regarding the scope of federal protection for
privileges or immunities that existed during that era. The Supreme
Court intervened when it narrowed the scope of privileges or
immunities with its 1872 decision in the Slaughter-House Cases."
H. Supreme Court Elaboration on the Meaning of Privileges or
Immunities
Prior history, the context in which the Fourteenth Amendment
was promulgated, and legislation intended to enforce that
Amendment, all demonstrated that privileges or immunities of
United States citizens should include statutory claims. Confirmation
of that theory came quickly and consistently from the United States
Supreme Court.
Initially, the Court took dramatic actions narrowing the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment from that which many of its proponents
advocated. The following sections will first look at the most visible of
those decisions, the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights
Cases.' Critics have focused upon the limitations derived from those
decisions. In contrast, this analysis will emphasize aspects of those
cases that have often been ignored and that support a view of federal
statutes as a primary source for privileges or immunities. Subsequent
sections will also develop the same theme, focusing on cases
construing "privileges or immunities" with regard to the Fourteenth
Amendment, Article IV, and modem interpretations of section 1983,
title 42 of the United States Code.
A. The Slaughter-House Cases
The preceding paragraphs provide groundwork for arguments
that framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood boundaries
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to include protection of
fundamental rights along with rights established through federal
Fourteenth Amendment and Public Accommodations, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 873,875 (1966).
112. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L. J. 1385,1426-30 (1992).
113. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
114. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment only empowered
Congress to remedy state action).
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legislation. One decision of the United States Supreme Court,
however, dramatically altered future debates regarding this issue.
Although many have argued that the Slaughter-House Cases
eliminated arguments for the potential dual meaning of privileges or
immunities described above, that conclusion does not necessarily
follow from the text of the opinion or from a consideration of the
concerns that were faced by participants in that debate.
The Slaughter-House Cases were brought by butchers of New
Orleans outraged by a Louisiana law forcing them to move all
slaughtering activities to the confines of a single livestock landing
area controlled by a state-established corporation."5 The dispute
arose in 1869, and records were filed with the Supreme Court in 1870.
The case was first argued in January of 1872 and then reargued in
February of that year because of the perceived gravity of the issues,
division within the Court, and concern that one of the Justices had
not been present for the first arguments."6 Participants recognized
this as the Court's first significant opportunity to interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment. The key question was whether operation of
a slaughtering house was a "privilege or immunity" that, therefore,
could not be taken away from butchers throughout the city and
confined to a state monopoly. The Court determined that the
butchers' claimed rights did not fall within the scope of privileges or
immunities.
The experience of living down wind from a mid-western meat
processing plant makes it easy for this author to understand that the
Supreme Court majority reached the correct conclusion in the
Slaughter-House Cases. It is also easy to understand why the people
of New Orleans supported the law in spite of its economic impact on
local butchers. Health and safety concerns as well as odor
undoubtedly motivated the state's decision to confine such activities
to a single small section of the city.
Whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the
Bill of Rights was not at issue before the Court. The specter faced by
Justice Miller as he wrote the opinion of the Court was not that
federal courts would be asked to protect individual freedom of
speech, free exercise of religion, or freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Instead, the question was whether the
Privileges or Immunities Clause implied a constitutional right to
115. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 58.
116. See id.
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freedom of contract. 7 Justice Miller's opinion anticipated cases like
Lochner v. New York," in which the Supreme Court acted in the
name of freedom for economic rights to bar states from protecting the
health and safety of their citizens. Lochner was wrongly decided for
the same reason that the holding in the Slaughter-House Cases was
correct.
Much of the argument that has taken place since the Slaughter-
House decision has amounted to claims that the reasoning of the
Court was flawed when it suggested that framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not intend to "bring within the power of Congress
the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to
the States."19 But that statement should be understood within the
unique context of the Slaughter-House Cases and concern about
congressional authority and judicial review over all cases in which
state exercise of the police power interfered in any way with the
economic or property interests of state residents. The Court majority
ruled, in essence, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not on its face
prohibit states from establishing monopolies in order to protect the
health and safety of their residents.20 As understood within that
context, the conclusion of the Supreme Court can be justified.' The
expansion of federal power that would have resulted from such a
broad vision of civil rights as that sought by the plaintiffs was beyond
acceptable bounds as contemplated by the Court's majority in 1872.
When Justice Miller expressed the majority's opinion that the
Fourteenth Amendment was focused upon the "one pervading
purpose" of securing "freedom of the slave race,""' and eschewed
117. Note that the Privileges or Immunities Clause originated as an enforcement
mechanism for the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which in turn guaranteed that "citizens of the
United States... of every race and color.., shall have the same right.., to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property... as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . ." Act
of Apr. 9, 1866, Sess. I, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). Justice Miller was, in effect, arguing
that such language should not be construed to give the federal government general
authority over all questions about contract rights, property rights and related concerns.
118. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
119. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77.
120. See id. at 66-78.
121. Compare the recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) in
which the Supreme Court announced the principle that Congress lacked authority to
expand its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by construing provisions
of the Bill of Rights to extend substantially beyond the definition of those rights
enunciated by the Court.
122. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
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transferring a broad expanse of traditional state responsibility to
Congress, he did not seriously address questions about whether the
first eight amendments were to be incorporated by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and applied to the states.n Furthermore, none of
the dissenters explicitly argued for incorporation.'24  The only
provision in the Bill of Rights that could, through incorporation, have
brought success to the plaintiffs would have been the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In telling passages, none of the
Justices gave significant weight to the argument that creation of a
slaughter-house monopoly represented a "taking" or violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
The real focus of the plaintiffs and the dissenters was on a view
of fundamental rights that embraced unfettered marketplace
competition. Their arguments bear close resemblance to the
Supreme Court majority opinion in Lochner. For example, plaintiffs'
counsel argued that "free competition in business, free enterprise, the
absence of all exactions by petty tyranny, of all spoliation of private
123. An argument that Justice Miller did not necessarily have the narrow vision of
Fourteenth Amendment rights generally associated with the Slaughter-Houses Cases is
illustrated by his subsequent comments which gave birth to modern concepts of
substantive due process:
[W]hen, in the year of grace 1866, there is placed in the Constitution of the
United States a declaration that 'No State shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,' can a State make any thing due
process of law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such? To
affirm this is to hold that the prohibition to the States is of no avail, or has no
application where the invasion of private rights is affected under the forms of
state legislation.
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97,102 (1877). John Hart Ely has suggested that Justice
Miller's inclusion of the right to assemble and petition the Government among the
privileges of national citizenship may indicate that the Court would have actually
embraced incorporation if asked to do so. ELY, supra note 9, at 196-197.
124. The closest to such an argument was made by Justice Bradley who referred to the
enumerated protections of the Bill of Rights, emphasizing the Due Process Clause, and
indicating that those provisions were "among the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States .... ." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 118-19 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
Justice Swayne's dissent could be construed to have similar import when he argued that
"By the Constitution, as it stood before the war, ample protection was given against
oppression by the Union, but little was given against wrong and oppression by the States.
That want was intended to be supplied by [the Fourteenth Amendment]." Id. at 129
(Swayne, J., dissenting).
125. Justice Miller noted for the majority that "[t]he argument has not been much
pressed in these cases that the defendant's charter deprives the plaintiffs of their property
without due process of law." Referring to interpretations of the Fifth Amendment and to
Due Process Clauses in existing state constitutions, he concluded that "under no
construction of that provision that we have ever seen ... can the restraint imposed... be
held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision." Id. at 80-81.
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right by public authority.., were exactly what the colonists sought
for and obtained by their settlement here .. ,,126 In his dissent,
Justice Field relied upon the British common law which, in his view,
secured "the natural right of every Englishman" to be free of
"interference with the liberty of the subject to pursue for his
maintenance and that of his family any lawful trade or
employment."1 27 He cited at length the views of Adam Smith:
The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and
dexterity of his own hands; and to hinder him from employing
this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper,
without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most
sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just
liberty both of the workman and of those who might be
disposed to employ him.28
Instead of incorporating any provision of the Bill of Rights to
support their arguments, both Justice Field and Justice Bradley relied
instead upon language from the Declaration of Independence."9
Justice Swayne's dissent, although less extensive and less eloquent,
relied just as squarely upon the theory that
[1]iberty is freedom from all restraints but such as are justly
imposed by law. Beyond that line lies the domain of usurpation
and tyranny. Property is everything which has an exchangeable
value, and the right of property includes the power to dispose of
it according to the will of the owner.'
One case cited by plaintiffs to support their argument against
state established monopolies was Gibbons v. Ogden.3' Closer
examination of Gibbons, however, illustrates the fundamental flaw in
the plaintiffs' case, and the fundamental reason why the Slaughter-
House Cases never seriously addressed issues of incorporation.
Gibbons was a case about regulation of interstate commerce and
federal supremacy within that context.12  The case could not be
stretched, as plaintiffs in Slaughter-House would have liked, to
encompass the principle that government-created monopolies
violated the Bill of Rights; Chief Justice Marshall would not have
questioned the authority of Congress to establish monopolies in the
126. Id. at 48 (argument by plaintiffs' counsel).
127. Id. at 104 (Field, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 110 n.39 (citing ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, b. 1, ch. 10. part 2.)
129. See id. at 105; id. at 115-16 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 127 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
131. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
132. Id. at 186-222.
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steamboat trade if Congress deemed such laws appropriate for the
regulation of interstate commerce. If the Constitution did not bar
Congress from establishing monopolies, then incorporation of the Bill
of Rights would not have led to the conclusion that states were barred
from establishing monopolies in the slaughter-house trade.
The point of this elaboration is not to argue either for or against
the incorporation doctrine. It is rather to establish the basic
reasonableness of the majority's decision to avoid wholly open-ended
interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that would
have invited unbounded federal interference with traditional state
police powers. For all of the reasons described above, the Slaughter-
House Cases did not present a viable forum within which to seriously
consider and resolve the issue of incorporation. Unfortunately, the
debate about incorporation has been blocked in large part because of
an opinion in which the issue was neither argued nor resolved. It is
also unfortunate that lingering preoccupation with that debate has
obscured the focus on privileges or immunities that were explicitly
embraced within the text of Justice Miller's opinion.
In key language, the Court supported protection for those
privileges and immunities "which owe their existence to the Federal
government, its national character, its Constitution, or its laws."33
Based upon this language, the laws of Congress should be a focal
point for measuring privileges or immunities. To the extent that
Congress acts within legitimate bounds, adopting generally applicable
legislation to protect individual rights or interests, states should not
be allowed to abridge those rights.
The dissenting opinion by Justice Field raised a challenge to this
analysis, which warranted a more careful response than that offered
by the majority. Justice Field noted that with the majority's
designation of privileges and immunities, "no new constitutional
provision was required" because "supremacy of the Constitution and
laws of the United States always controlled any state legislation of
that character."1" Justice Field drew the conclusion that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was not needed to reinforce the
Supremacy Clause.
The Supreme Court majority, however, understood the
disingenuous element of Justice Field's argument. One year earlier,
Field had faced the problem of a Wisconsin court that asserted
133. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
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authority over federal officials. 35 He wrote an opinion declaring that,
under the Supremacy Clause, state sovereignty must yield to the
sovereignty of the federal government. Field noted that the
"experience of the late rebellion has shown us that, in times of great
popular excitement, there may be found in every State large numbers
ready and anxious to embarrass the operations of the government,
and easily persuaded to believe every step taken for the enforcement
of its authority illegal and void." '136 While Justice Field apparently
read this recent history to support his conclusion that reinforcement
of the Supremacy Clause was not needed, others reading the same
history reached the opposite conclusion.3 7 The fact that cases
supporting theories of state nullification were still being litigated at
the time when the Fourteenth Amendment was promulgated proved
the continuing need to reinforce federal supremacy.
Justice Field's preferred answer to his question whether the
Privileges or Immunities Clause had broadened federal power was
based upon congressional enactment of the Civil Rights Act, which
protected contract and property rights and assured the "full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property." '38 Field saw in this language an intent to expand federal
power to superintend all state contract and property law. With his
language carried to its extreme, Field would have relied upon the
Privileges or Immunities Clause to enforce Adam Smith's vision of an
unregulated marketplace.
Although mistaken in the application of his concepts, Justice
Field may have been more in tune than his brethren with the spirit of
the generation that promulgated the Fourteenth Amendment as to
the need for federal protection of civil rights,139 even though the
majority gave a better answer to the actual question pending before
the Court."4 In retrospect, Justice Field's analysis was wrong in one
135. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397 (1871) (holding that Wisconsin state judge could
not interfere with federal military enlistment).
136. Id. at 408.
137. See comments by Congressman John Bingham, supra., text accompanying notes
81-87.
138. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting) (internal quotes
omitted.).
139. See NELSON, supra note 33, at 156-58.
140. As previously noted, neither Field nor the majority really addressed the issue of
incorporation which may have provided a better answer to the question that Field was
raising. See AMAR, supra note 10, at 163-230 (developing the case for a "refined" theory
of incorporation).
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respect but right in another.
First, although the Civil Rights Act "place[d] the common rights
of American citizens under the protection of the National
Government,''. that Act did not prohibit Louisiana from establishing
a slaughter-house monopoly. Thus, the fact that the Fourteenth
Amendment created new authority for Congress to enact laws
protecting privileges and immunities did not mean that Congress had
done so in a manner that protected the butchers of New Orleans.
Furthermore, when viewed from the perspective of contemporary
constitutional doctrine, Justice Field was wrong when he suggested
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause broadly expanded the power
of Congress to establish federal rights significantly beyond those
otherwise established by the Constitution.'42
At the time of his decision, however, many members of Congress
agreed with Justice Field. Their position was documented by the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, and even more clearly through passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was already under consideration
at the time when the Slaughter-House Cases were decided. Congress
anticipated the need to assure that states would not interfere with
those privileges or immunities that were protected by federal law.
With hindsight, we know that Congress was right to assert its
authority to protect individuals from private invidious discrimination
even if the constitutional basis for doing so was the Commerce Clause
rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. The critical point is that,
although the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not expand the power of Congress to enact such
laws, it did reestablish federal supremacy so that once such laws were
passed, states were obligated to accept their authority.
Regardless of whether or to what extent Justice Miller's majority
opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases appeared redundant to the
Supremacy Clause, both the majority and the dissenters agreed on
several essential points that support a current interpretation of
congressional authority derived from the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Thus, all of the Justices cited with some level of approval
Judge Washington's decision in Corfield v. Coryell.14' All of the
Justices would appear, therefore, to have agreed that, when Congress
acted within its power to protect "the right to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety," it would be acting to protect privileges or
141. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 93 (Field, J., dissenting).
142. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
143. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
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immunities. Although the majority and the dissenters may have
disagreed about the existing scope of congressional authority to enact
such legislation, they would not have disagreed about the supremacy
of federal law when derived from legitimate sources of federal power.
Valid federal laws protecting interests comparable to those identified
by Judge Washington in Corfield would be construed as privileges or
immunities of United States citizens, and conflicting state law should
yield accordingly. The conclusion that follows is that when one
combines the Privileges or Immunities Clause as understood at the
time of the Slaughter-House Cases with the Commerce Clause as
understood today, Congress has power to enforce such laws against
the states themselves, free from Eleventh Amendment constraints.
B. The Civil Rights Cases
In the Civil Rights Cases,M the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of challenges to private acts of race discrimination
based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1875. This was the second, and
some would say the last, "big" case in which the Court focused upon
the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The majority
concluded that Congress lacked power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment in the absence of government action.4 '
Although remembered primarily for their disagreements about
the need for "state action," both the majority opinion by Justice
Bradley and the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan help to
illuminate our understanding of privileges or immunities. The reason
given by Justice Bradley for striking down the act was not that the
issues embraced were outside of the scope of privileges or
immunities. His opinion for the Court worked from an assumption
that the subject matter of the act involved "rights, privileges and
immunities of citizens which cannot rightfully be abridged by state
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.', 1 6 He noted that: "Should
any such servitudes be imposed by a state law, there can be no doubt
that the law would be repugnant to the Fourteenth, no less than to the
Thirteenth Amendment .... ,"" From the Court's perspective, the
problem with the legislation was that it was "primary and direct"
rather than "corrective" of state laws or actions."4 In a remarkable
144. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
145. See id. at 13.
146. Id. at 21.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 19.
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anticipation of future events, Justice Bradley also observed that
different conclusions could follow if Congress had authority to
address such issues directly, for example, through the exercise of its
power to regulate commerce.14 9
The state action doctrine that emerged from Justice Bradley's
opinion narrowed the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment from that
contemplated by the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1875; it is an
open question as to whether this narrower vision was consistent with
the views of those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment. In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's
analysis was inconsistent with the sentiments of the time. He
explained that "[i]t is not the words of the law but the internal sense
of it that makes the law; the letter of law is the body; the sense and
reason of the law is the soul."'  In his view, the Civil War
Amendments guaranteed to all, those "rights, privileges, or
immunities... belonging to citizens of the white race in the same
State. ,..
The gap between the opinions of Justice Bradley and Justice
Harlan may not have been as wide as it initially appears. Both
Justices recognized that, following enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, all citizens were to be afforded equal rights of
admission to an inn, a public conveyance, or a place of public
amusement. Justice Bradley reasoned that states continued to have
primary responsibility for enforcing those rights, which were
"presumably subject to redress by [state] laws until the contrary
appears."' " Justice Harlan believed that the national government
could provide direct protection without reference to the failings of
state law." Both Justices thus entertained comparable visions of
equality and both also recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
had directly or indirectly secured these visions.
Current constitutional law can be faithful to core views expressed
by both Justice Bradley and Justice Harlan. Congress has the
authority to address private acts of discrimination when those acts
have a substantial cumulative effect on interstate commerce.' The
149. See id.
150. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
151. Id. at 48 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 24 (noting that if state laws fail to provide protection, Congress may adopt
"corrective legislation" to counteract the effect of state laws or state action).
153. See id. at 57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
154. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
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Commerce Clause limitation is consistent with concerns about
unlimited federal power that motivated Justice Bradley; the breadth
of authority currently derived from that clause is consistent with the
"sense and reason of the law,"'' 55 embracing some measure of the
contract and property rights that were understood at the time when
Justice Harlan wrote. In other words, expansive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause has established the conditions that Justice Bradley
anticipated; it also allows Congress to embrace the spirit of the law
described by Justice Harlan.
C. Applications of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Slaughter-House Cases set the stage for subsequent
interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The
framework of Justice Miller's decision has been routinely accepted by
subsequent courts that focus their attention on the question of
whether given rights "owe their existence to the Federal government,
its national character, its Constitution or its laws." '156 Claims often
rose or fell based upon whether federal statutes provided underlying
support for the claimants.
Thus, Justice Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases
narrowed, but did not eviscerate the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Justice Miller illustrated the use of the Clause when he wrote United
States v. Waddell 7 in 1884. The issue was whether the United States
had authority to prosecute individuals for conspiring against "any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the constitution and laws of the United States.""
The case involved defendants' interference with an individual's
efforts to establish a homestead on federal land. The question came
down to whether "the right to remain on the land in order to perform
the requirements of the act of congress" was within the purview of the
federal statute.'59 Power to create the homestead law was derived
from Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution, which authorized
Congress to regulate property of the United States. Having acted
within that authority, Congress established a privilege or immunity
for individual citizens. As explained by the Court, "No such right
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
155. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
156. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79.
157. 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
158. Rev. St. U.S. § 5508, 18 U.S.C. § 51, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 19S1.
159. See Waddell, 112 U.S. at 80.
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exists or can exist outside of an act of congress."' ' The Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment secured
congressional authority to protect individuals from interference with
that right. It may be that Congress had authority to enact anti-
conspiracy laws like the one at issue in Waddell prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment, but ratification of the Amendment
eliminated any doubt.
The Waddell case illustrates the basic point underlying this
article's thesis. Privileges or immunities of United States citizenship
can be created by Congress, acting pursuant to its enumerated
powers. Given that premise, it follows that the Fourteenth
Amendment reinforced the Supremacy Clause and reestablished
congressional authority to enforce federal rights, thereby eliminating
any reasonable doubts about whether claims to state sovereignty
qualified or constrained those rights.
Other cases also serve to illustrate the relationship between
"privileges or immunities" and federal statutes. For example, the
Court ruled in 1875 that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not
mean that women had a right to vote."' The case was one of several
in which the Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment "did
not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen. It simply
furnished an additional guaranty for the protection of such as he
already had."'62 The Court reasoned that Congress had not enacted
any law granting such a right.63 Voting rights for women could not
have been privileges or immunities as a matter of state law because
that law had not been construed as such historically 64 and because the
privileges and immunities of state citizens, embraced by Article IV,
could not have conferred voting rights on citizens from other states."
The Court's decision regarding women's voting rights, however,
reflects little more than the deeply rooted sexism of the era in which
the Court acted.' 6 The right to vote eventually came to be recognized
as a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship. Later
decisions were explained by noting that when state law had
160. Id. at 79.
161. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
162. Id. at 171.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 172-73.
165. See id. at 174.
166. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (upholding rule that precluded women
from practicing law based upon "the civil law, as well as nature herself").
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determined an individual was part of a class of persons on whom the
right to vote had been conferred, federal protection of that right
could be inferred from the Constitution.67
Another illustration of the rights and privileges of national
citizenship was. provided by an 1895 decision upholding federal
prosecution of individuals who interfered with efforts by citizens to
report violations of internal revenue laws."6 Interpreting federal law
punishing conspiracies "to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States,"'69
the Court explained that barring the federal government from
enacting laws of this sort "would tend to defeat the independence and
the supremacy of the national government.""17  In reaching this
conclusion, the Court also explained:
Every right, created by, arising under, or dependent upon the
Constitution, may be protected and enforced by such means
and in such manner as Congress, in the exercise of the
correlative duty of protection, or of the legislative powers
conferred upon it by the Constitution, may in its discretion
deem most eligible and best adapted to attain the object.'
In a series of other cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause did not apply because the rights in
question did not "owe their existence to the Federal government. ' 72
In United States v. Cruikshank, defendants had been charged with
conspiring to prevent two African-Americans from exercising their
right of peaceable assembly." The Court rejected that indictment,
finding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause only protected the
right of assembly if it was in some manner linked to powers or duties
167. Ex parte Yarbrough, "The Ku-Klux Klan Cases," 110 U.S. 651 (1884). See also
United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915) (finding that right to vote was a right or
privilege secured by the Constitution or law of the United States for all citizens, even in
the absence of allegations of race discrimination); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(1941) (holding that voting in primary elections was a privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution).
168. See In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
169. I& at 535.
170. Id. at 537.
171. Id. at 535 (citing Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263,293 (1892)).
172. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 539 (1922) (upholding state
employee discharge laws); Owmbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 113 (1921) (upholding foreign
attachment rules); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 553 (1919) (upholding state
inheritance laws).
173. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
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of the national government.174 In the same year, the Court used
similar reasoning to conclude that the right to a jury trial was not a
privilege or immunity of national citizenship applicable to state
courts.' The Court reasoned that state law allowing judges to rule in
cases of a hung civil jury did not violate "the Constitution, or any law
or treaty of the United States."'7 6 The right to bear arms was not
deemed a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States in
Presser v. Illinois.'F The Court stressed that an individual who was
not a member of an organized militia had no right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to organize with others as a military unit; to
establish such a right "he must be able to point to the provision of the
Constitution or statutes of the United States by which it is
conferred.'
178
In 1939, a Supreme Court plurality relied upon the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as the basis for concluding that Jersey City could
not prohibit the assembly of labor organizers. 79 Although the holding
derived from that case is generally cited purely in terms of the right of
assembly, it is worth looking more closely at the Court's presentation
of the issue:
174. See id. at 552-53. It should be noted that the primary problem in this case was the
"vague and general" nature of the indictment. Id. at 559. The ruling left broad scope for
the federal government to act, and implied that defendants could have been charged for a
violation of federally protected privileges or immunities if the indictment had specified
that the victims were assembling "for consultation in respect to public affairs and to
petition for a redress of grievances." Id. at 552. Defects in the indictment might also have
been cured if Defendants had been charged with attacking the victims "on account of their
race," and therefore with violating provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See id. at
555. The absence of such specific terms in the indictment led to the discharge of the
defendants.
175. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
176. Id. at 93. See also, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); U.S. v. Waddell, 112 U.S.
76 (1884)(upholding state use of an eight person jury in a criminal case and rejecting
general theories of incorporation). In discussing the meaning of federal privileges or
immunities, the Court identified the issue of uniformity; where diversity within and among
states is acceptable, then the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment would not apply. Id. at 599-600.
177. 116 U.S. 252,266-67 (1886).
178. Id. at 266.
179. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Only seven Justices
participated in the decision. Justice Roberts, with Justice Black concurring, relied upon
the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the basis for his decision. See id. at 514. Justices
Stone, Reed and Butler did not reject the reasoning that Congress created privileges or
immunities of United States citizens when it enacted the National Labor Relations Act,
but they did not agree that the record of the case adequately supported that conclusion.
See id. at 522 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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The question now presented is whether freedom to disseminate
information concerning the provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act, to assemble peaceably for discussion of the Act,
and of the opportunities and advantages offered by it, is a
privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States secured
against State abridgment.'
It was the focus on the National Labor Relations Act that
distinguished this case from Cruikshank. Justice Roberts' opinion
noted the "confusion and debate" regarding federal and state
relationships prior to the Civil War."' He concluded that the
Fourteenth Amendment resolved the debate: "Thence forward
citizenship of the United States became primary and citizenship of a
State secondary."'' Justice Roberts' reasoning supports a conclusion
that the range of rights included in the National Labor Relations Act
constituted privileges or immunities established by federal law.
Action by Congress, rather than an inherent right of assembly,
transformed the claim into one which owed its existence to the
federal government.
After 1939, the Supreme Court rarely made direct reference to
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause. An
exception was the recent case of Saenz v. Roe." Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens reaffirmed the doctrine that states could not
discriminate when distributing welfare benefits to new residents."
Instead of once again failing "to ascribe the source of this right to
travel interstate to a particular constitutional privilege," s5 Justice
Stevens found that "[d]espite fundamentally differing views
concerning [its] coverage ... it has always been common ground" that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects this "component of the
right to travel."' 86 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas dissented, all other members of the Court joined in this
opinion.
The relatively unique aspect of the Court's decision in Saenz was
its use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a source of inherent
rights derived from the Constitution without a separate basis in
federal statutes. As noted by Justice Stevens, the Court's decision
180. Id. at 512.
181. Id. at 509.
182. Id. at 510.
183. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
184. See id. at 507.
185. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,630 (1969).
186. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873)).
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remained consistent with the Slaughter-House framework, protecting
claims owing their existence to the "national character, Constitution
or laws" of the federal government." Beyond that right to travel
ruling, however, few efforts have been made to protect meaningful
substantive rights derived directly from the Privileges or Immunities
Clause."s Although few scholars have asked about the congressional
role in defining the privileges or immunities protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has explored the
meaning of that phrase in other contexts in ways that strengthen the
thesis of this article.
D. Interpretations of Article IV
In addition to the limited number of interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause described
above, the Supreme Court also interpreted the Article IV counterpart
to that Clause in ways that further illustrate the meaning of both.
Courts have historically recognized the overlapping scope of the
Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV. In 1870, the Supreme Court invalidated a Maryland law
that forced nonresidents to purchase a license to sell non-agricultural
goods within the state. Relying upon both the Commerce Clause and
the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Court
emphasized the "comprehensive meaning" as well as the commercial
scope of the latter: "[T]he clause plainly and unmistakably secures
and protects the right of a citizen of one state to pass into any other
state of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce,
trade or business, without molestation... ."'8 The link between
privileges and immunities and the Commerce Clause was illustrated
when the Court reasoned that if states had power to impose
discriminatory taxes against citizens from another state, then "the
power conferred upon Congress to regulate interstate commerce
[would be] of no value .... " Justice Harlan expressed similar
thoughts when he wrote in 1879 that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV secures "the equality of commercial
privileges... to citizens of the several States" and forbids material
187. See supra text accompanying note 156.
188. But see Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991) (ruling that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
protected "rights, privileges or immunities," derived from the Constitution or laws of the
United States could be relied upon for enforcement of the dormant Commerce Clause).
189. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418,430 (1870).
190. Id.
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impairment of such privileges.19
In the Twentieth Century, the Court erected a temporary
roadblock to development of the non-discrimination principle
embodied in Article IV. In 1919, the Court drew a line between
"residence" and "citizenship," holding that Article IV, Section 2, only
applied to the latter.'92 States were free to discriminate against
nonresidents as long as they were not discriminating on the basis of
state citizenship. 3 As a result, a state statute which mandated that
insurance brokers reside within the state was sustained, as citizens of
the enacting state who resided elsewhere were included in the class
discriminated against.94 For decades following this decision, state
commercial regulations that discriminated against nonresidents
tended to be challenged under the Commerce Clause rather than the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
In 1975, the Supreme Court effectively eliminated the distinction
between citizens and residents,95 and in 1984 the Court noted that, in
some instances, the Privileges and Immunities Clause will reach
conduct that may not be implicitly barred by the Commerce Clause."
For these reasons, cases relying upon the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV have once again become more common.
The Court has continued to draw a line between "those
'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as
a single entity" and those deemed less fundamental."l The Court thus
drew a line between recreational big-game hunting licenses"9 and
commercial fishing licenses, the former deemed less than
fundamental."l State laws favoring employment of "qualified"
residents violate the Article IV Clause," as do those insisting upon
191. Guy v. City of Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1879) (striking down
discriminatory fees on the use of public wharves).
192. La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 470 (1919) (upholding a two year
residency requirement for licensed insurance brokers).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975). See also Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
196. See United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208
(1984) (distinguishing White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204 (1983)).
197. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mon., 436 U.S. 371,383 (1978).
198. See id.
199. See id. at 386 (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)).
200. See Hicklin, 437 U.S. 518.
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residency as a condition for practicing law. 1 Discrimination against
nonresidents with respect to payment of taxes,m access to medical
facilities,' and access to natural resources' have all been deemed
unconstitutional.
A commercial nexus appears in virtually all cases in which state
regulations have been found to violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV. That element is significant, since in such cases
Congress could presumably regulate the same behavior based upon
its Commerce Clause authority. For example, Congress undoubtedly
has the power to regulate commercial fishing licenses or purchases of
hydroelectric power. Congress would also have the authority to
establish rules governing access to employment and to medical care.
What makes this observation noteworthy is that, in exercising such
powers, Congress would be acting pursuant to its Commerce Clause
authority while also acting to protect "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States." This dual authority, derived from both
Article I of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, is the
key to understanding why the Privileges or Immunities opens a door
for abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity, even if the
Commerce Clause did not independently have that effect.
E. Interpretations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
One more piece to the puzzle completes the picture that
privileges or immunities can be derived from federal law. In recent
years the Supreme Court has been called upon repeatedly to interpret
the scope of the federal statutes protecting the "rights, privileges or
immunities" of United States citizens. They have done so without
any debate pertaining to the original text of the Fourteenth
Amendment on which those statutes were based. Nevertheless, the
Court's conclusions unmistakably point towards recognizing federal
statutes as a basis for those rights.
As previously noted, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 became law for
the express purpose of carrying out the mandate that Congress
201. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
202. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Lunding v. New York Tax
Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 289 (1998).
203. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
204. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). In reaching these decisions, the Court abandoned the
"legal fiction" of state ownership of natural resources that originally motivated Justice
Washington in his path breaking decision in Corfield.
Winter 2001]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
received from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 ' As revised
in 1874, the remedial section of that Act provided:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.2l
The only subsequent changes made to that remedial language
extended its protection to residents of the District of Columbia.2 0
The jurisdictional provisions that were part of the original Civil
Rights Act of 1871 were eventually divided and narrowed in scope so
as only to encompass "any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States."'
The Supreme Court has distinguished between these remedial
and jurisdictional statutes. In an opinion filled with debate regarding
the origin and history of these provisions, the Court concluded in
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization2 that the
jurisdictional statute did not include claims that state welfare
regulations violated the Social Security Act."0 One year later, in
Maine v. Thiboutot,21' the Court rejected arguments for a narrow
interpretation of the remedial statute. The Court concluded that
state deprivation of welfare benefits protected by the Social Security
Act violated the protection of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for "rights. privileges
or immunities" secured by federal law."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recounted its prior
decisions in which it had found that "no doubt that § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act [of 1871] was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly
205. See supra at text accompanying notes 99-113.
206. Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1874).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Revisions pertaining to the District of Columbia
were made in 1979.
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1994).
209. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
210. Id. at 623.
211. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
212. Id. at 5 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 n. 30 (1972); Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,543 n. 7 (1972)).
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construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected
rights., 213 It noted numerous other decisions of the Court in which
section 1983 had been "necessarily the exclusive statutory cause of
action., 214 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan also observed
that when Congress added the words "and laws" to the Civil Rights
Act, it was "aware of what it was doing"25 and did not object to
codification, which protected rights derived from the Constitution
and laws of the United States. Instead of revisiting the deep divisions
regarding statutory history that had surfaced a year earlier in the
Chapman case, the majority in Thiboutot concluded that federal
statutory rights were protected by a plain reading of section 1983.16
The argument that Justice Brennan did not make, but that should by
now be obvious, is that the 1874 Congress did not object to including
a reference to federal law in the revised text of the Civil Rights Act
because that language was entirely consistent with the meaning of
"privileges or immunities" as understood on that date.
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and
clarified this conclusion. Not every federal statute establishes a
"right, privilege or immunity," and not every violation of federal law
establishes a basis for claiming protection under section 1983. Two
cases were decided in 1981 that limited relief under section 1983. In
the first, the Court concluded that a federal financial aid program for
treatment of the developmentally disabled, although characterized as
a "bill of rights," did not evidence clear congressional intent to
establish a personal cause of action.217  Plaintiffs had failed to
convince the Court that they had a "right secured" by federal law,
especially where the law itself provided for an alternative, exclusive
remedy.218 In the second case, the Court rejected claims for violations
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act independently of the
procedures provided for by that Act.219 Although rejecting a theory of
implied private actions, the Court did not determine that victims of
water pollution lacked "privileges or immunities" that had been
213. Id. at 5 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,700-
01 (1978) (concluding that municipalities are persons under § 1983)).
214. Id- at 6.
215. Id. at 8.
216. Id.
217. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
218. Id. at 28.
219. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S.
1 (1981).
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violated by state or local governments.' The conclusion was simply
that Congress provided alternative remedies for those victims and by
doing so precluded relief under section 1983."2
In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,2 the Court
found that the "interest in being free of government regulation of the
'peaceful methods of putting economic pressure upon one another"'
was a right conferred on employers and employees by the National
Labor Relations Act.' In other words, state and local governments
could not interfere with the rights, privileges or immunities protected
by section 1983. Prior to reaching this conclusion, the Justices
identified a three part test to determine whether Congress established
a claim that falls within the parameters of section 1983. First, the law
must establish binding obligations., 4 Second, the interest cannot be
too "vague and amorphous" for judicial enforcement."' Finally, the
person claiming the right must be an intended beneficiary of the
federal law. 6 These requirements mark the Supreme Court's
contemporary definition of rights, privileges or immunities.
This review of Supreme Court decisions leads finally to the issue
of whether it is possible that individuals can establish "rights,
privileges or immunities" under federal law, as defined by the federal
statute that was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,
without Congress having authority under the Fourteenth Amendment
to enforce such actions against states. The current Supreme Court
Justices may be able to resolve the paradox suggested by this
question. At the very least, they need to be asked to do so.
220. Id. at 19.
221. See id. at 21.
222. 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a section 1983 remedy
for violations of the National Labor Relations Act).
223. Id. at 112 (quoting Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132, 154 (1976)).
224. See id. at 106 (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19).
225. See id. (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479
U.S. 418,431-32 (1987)).
226. See id. (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 430).
227. The Court also eliminated any doubt about links between the Commerce Clause
and section 1983 when it ruled in 1991 "that the Commerce Clause confers 'rights,
privileges, or immunities"' within the meaning of that law. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S.
439, 446 (1991) (concluding that § 1983 could be relied upon to enforce dormant
commerce clause claims). See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review
under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 233 (1991).
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I. Federalism, Immunity, and Enforcement of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause
The relationship between federal law and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause described above can be easily traced to
Nineteenth Century origins. The Fourteenth Amendment eliminated
the nullification doctrine and reestablished a conception of state
sovereignty subordinate to legitimate actions of Congress taken to
protect individual rights. Justice Miller explained this at the time of
the Slaughter-House Cases, and Justice Roberts still understood this
lesson when he was writing in 1939.' In the late Twentieth Century,
however, courts and commentators rarely examined the scope of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. At least two factors contributed to
this lack of discussion. The first, discussed in detail in prior sections,
is that most of the focus on privileges or immunities dealt with
problems of defining those inherent rights that could be incorporated
or inferred from the Constitution. 9 That debate overshadowed the
more mundane acceptance of, and at times even insistence upon, a
federal statutory basis for privileges or immunities.
Even more important, however, was that no significant need
arose to find within the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause a source of authority to protect individuals from
state law. No one sought to reinforce the Supremacy Clause. At least
until the Court's recent decisions, Nineteenth Century claims that
state sovereignty included power to ignore or nullify federal law all
but disappeared.
A primary issue for much of the Twentieth Century was whether
Congress had power to enact laws regulating the national economy.
There was little need to question whether congressional actions based
upon that power established privileges or immunities for United
States citizens. One context in which that issue could logically have
arisen developed when the Court was asked to decide whether
Congress had authority to expand federal law so as to protect state
employees. The Court moved back and forth on that issue, first
finding that some state employees were protected by the Fair Labor
Standards Act,m then concluding that the Act could not be enforced
against states when doing so interfered with integral governmental
228. See Hague v. Committee for Indust. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), and text
accompanying notes 179-181.
229. See text accompanying notes 9,66 and 72-74.
230. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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functions,231 and then reversing course again when five Justices
concluded that the traditional or integral functions test was
unworkable. 232 The Court's analysis turned on the breadth of the
Commerce Clause and its interaction with the Tenth Amendment.
Although it may have been logical to discuss the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in that context, there was no substantial reason to
do so because the outcome of the Court's analysis would be the same
whether the source of congressional power was attributed to the
Commerce Clause or to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
That crucial fact changed in 1996 when five Supreme Court
Justices decided that the Commerce Clause did not empower
Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.233 With that
decision, the Court found for the first time that the Eleventh
Amendment blocked the operation of the Supremacy Clause when
private parties had been explicitly authorized by Congress to enforce
their federal rights against the states; only a source of congressional
power that modified Eleventh Amendment immunity could therefore
be used to protect individual rights from state interference. As a
result, the time has now arrived to decide what was meant when
Justice Miller determined that the Fourteenth Amendment protected
the privileges or immunities derived from the Constitution or laws of
the federal government. Before reaching that question, however, it is
necessary to review the Supreme Court's treatment of the Eleventh
Amendment, and the interaction of those rulings with its views
regarding the scope of congressional authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment appears both simple and
relatively benign: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." This language
emerged as a direct response to the Supreme Court decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia which held that diversity jurisdiction of federal
courts could be used by citizens of one state to enforce debts against
231. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,851 (1976).
232. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
233. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
234. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
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another state3 s Creation of federal common law liability of states
clashed with traditional conceptions of state sovereignty; the reaction
to the Court's decision was immediate and dramatic3 6 Within five
years the Constitution had been amended to preclude such actions.'
In subsequent years, the Supreme Court added complexity to the
Eleventh Amendment as it addressed questions about state liability
for violations of federal law. Initially, the Court, led by Chief Justice
Marshall, found that the Eleventh Amendment had not barred
federal question jurisdiction in cases brought against state officials3m
Marshall saw this holding as essential to preserving the role of federal
courts in enforcing the Supremacy Clause and assuring uniformity of
federal law throughout the states.39 By the 1890's, however, the spirit
of the Court had changed and protection of state sovereignty gained
strength. In Hans v. Louisiana, Supreme Court Justices found that
"suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to the
law."m  It therefore ruled that a citizen could not sue its own state in
federal court even though the Eleventh Amendment did not address
that issue.241 The Court made clear that interpretation of the
Amendment should not be determined by reference to the letter of
the law, but rather by reference to broad traditional conceptions of
state sovereignty.242 As expressed in more recent cases, the Justices
"have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition... which it confirms.,
243
The broad holding in Hans, however, was not the last word in
construing the scope of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. In
the same year that the Court limited Eleventh Amendment immunity
to preclude suits by a state's own citizens, the Justices also
determined that the Amendment did not protect independent
agencies or political subdivisions within a state.' Cities, counties,
235. Id at 479 (writing for the Court was Chief Justice Jay).
236. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1054-63 (1983) (detailing the response to
Chisholm).
237. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
238. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
239. See id. at 846-59.
240. 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890).
241. See id. at 15.
242. See id.
243. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,53 (1996).
244. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890) (finding that counties
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school boards or other agencies independent of direct state control
could be sued in federal court245 even when state statutes attempted to
limit actions against them to state courts.246
Other exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity go even
more directly to the heart of state liability. The Court recognized that
the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude suits against states
brought by the federal government.247  Current statutory law
authorizes bringing such actions in federal district courts.24 Based on
Supreme Court decisions that predate the recent spate of restrictive
holdings,249 suits by the federal government may be brought against
states even when the purpose for doing so is to protect the rights of
private citizens who would be barred from filing personal actions.'
It has also been understood that the Eleventh Amendment does
not preclude suits against state officials for prospective injunctive
relief. This principle, identified with Ex parte Young," had been
referred to as "settled doctrine" as early as 1898.52 In Ex parte
Young, the majority concluded that state action that violated federal
law was invalid; therefore, "[i]t is simply an illegal act upon the part
of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of the state, to
enforce a legislative enactment which is void, because
unconstitutional." 3 In more recent applications of this doctrine, the
Court recognized that claims for prospective injunctive relief may
have a fiscal impact upon the state without crossing the line
precluding monetary damages. Thus, although barring retrospective
are municipal corporations and not protected by the Eleventh Amendment).
245. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,401
(1979) (holding that interstate compact agency was not immune from suit in federal court).
246. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(holding that school boards were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).
247. See Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v. Department of
Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279,286 (1973).
248. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251(b)(2), 1345 (1997).
249. See cases cited, supra note 1.
250. See E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (enforcing Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Employees of Dept. of Public Health, 411 U.S. 279 (allowing suit by
Secretary of Labor to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act).
251. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
252. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518 (1898) (blocking enforcement of
unconstitutional law by state officials). For prior examples, see Poindexter v. Greenhow,
114 U.S. 270 (1885) (blocking seizure of property by state tax collector); Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891) (restraining land commissioners from violating contract
based upon unconstitutional state law).
253. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159.
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monetary damages, the Justices upheld a prospective order to
disburse state funds in conformity with federal law.2" In reaching
these judgments, the Court has repeatedly stressed the necessity of
Ex parte Young to preserve the supremacy of federal law."
It should be noted that the Ex parte Young exception from
Eleventh Amendment immunity only applies to claims of state
violation of federal law, not to claims that the state violated its own
law. The Supreme Court explained that the exception was needed to
protect the uniformity and supreme authority of the federal law and
that those concerns "disappear" when parties seek to enforce pendent
state claims against state officials. 6
The long standing and seemingly settled exceptions to Eleventh
Amendment immunity described above also appeared consistent with
a more general rule that allowed Congress to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The Court illustrated this general rule when
it upheld awards based upon the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976.' Congressional abrogation in that case could be
attributed to a power of Congress derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' In a 1989 plurality opinion, the Court extended that
ruling to apply also when Congress expressly abrogated Eleventh
Amendment immunity based upon its Commerce Clause power. "
Seven years later, in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court
overruled that holding.26°  The majority explained that it did not
question congressional authority to use its power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to expressly abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity.'61 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court also
254. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974). See also Quem v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332 (1979) (upholding district court order that members of the class be notified that
they may be eligible for past welfare benefits pursuant to state administrative procedure).
255. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997)
(rejecting application of Ex parte Young doctrine when Indian tribe sought relief
comparable to a quiet title action).
256. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 90.
257. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978). See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491
U.S. 274, 279 (1989) (holding that "an award of attorney's fees ancillary to prospective
relief is not subject to the strictures of the Eleventh Amendment").
258. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457 (1976) (concluding that award of
monetary damages against state government for violations of individual's rights under
Title VII did not violate Eleventh Amendment because authority was derived from
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
259. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
260. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
261. See id. at 59.
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restated traditional exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity for
direct federal enforcement and for suits for injunctive relief72
In subsequent years the Court's majority has seized the Eleventh
Amendment as a tool for enforcing its vision of federalism. In doing
so, the Court has rejected arguments that states constructively waived
some aspects of their immunity through their participation in
commercial activities.2' After eliminating the Commerce Clause
basis for congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment, the
Court subsequently ruled that other sources of Article I authority
could also not be used for that purpose.2' These decisions did not
modify settled doctrine that Fourteenth Amendment rights would
override Eleventh Amendment constraints. As a result, the focus of
debate shifted to questions about whether Congress reasonably relied
on the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for abrogation.
Analysis of Fourteenth Amendment abrogation of state
sovereign immunity begins with reference to the interpretive role
assigned to Congress by Section 5 of that Amendment. In City of
Boerne v. Flores,2 5 the Court ruled that enforcement of rights derived
from the First Amendment religion clauses, incorporated and made
applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, must be congruent and proportional with Supreme
Court interpretations of those amendments.2s6 Congressional
authority was purely remedial, and could not extend to expanding the
scope of the First Amendment.267
The majority relied upon this principle when asked in subsequent
cases about whether Congress had reasonably relied upon the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank,26 the Court again reasoned that
Congress could not act in a manner that was "'so out of proportion to
a supposed remedial or preventive object' that [the congressional act]
262. See id. at 91 n.14.
263. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999) (concluding that Florida could not be sued for false advertising under
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1999)) (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry. of
Alabama State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)).
264. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary, 527 U.S. 627 (concluding that the Patent
Clause could not be relied upon to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity).
265. 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997).
266. Id. at 520.
267. Id. at 519.
268. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
[Vol. 28
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES
could not be understood 'as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior."'269  Pursuing this line of analysis, the
Court recognized that patent rights constituted a form of property
and that state infringement of patent rights could be seen as a
deprivation of property without due process."0 Mere identification of
patent rights as property, however, did not automatically mean that
federal remedies for state infringement of patent rights were
congruent and proportional to the remedial authority that Congress
was given under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.27'
According to the majority, that claim would lie only if states were
failing to offer their own remedies to patent violations.2' Because
Congress acted without evidence of such abuse, and without a careful
assessment of existing state remedies, it could not rely upon the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as a basis for abrogating
state immunity from federal patent enforcement actions.' r
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,.74 the Court reemphasized
this doctrine, holding Alabama immune from suit for violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.275 Kimel argued that
Congress had power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
from liability for age discrimination based upon the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 The Court rejected that
argument on grounds that, because age discrimination issues were
only subject to rational basis review under prevailing equal protection
analysistm states should easily be able to meet that standard.278 Again
using the "congruence and proportionality" test of City of Boerne, the
majority found that requirements of the ADEA were
"disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably
could be targeted by the Act."279 The same Justices followed the same
rationale to conclude in Board of Trustees of the University of
269. 1d at 639 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532).
270. See id. at 642.
271. See id at 642-43.
272. See id at 643.
273. See id. at 647.
274. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
275. 29 U.S.C. § 629 et. seq. (1994)(Supp. 1111997).
276. Kime 528 U.S. at 78.
277. See id. at 83.
278. See id. at 84-85.
279. Id. at 82. See Massachusetts Bd of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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Alabama v. Garrett' that Congress could not abrogate state
immunity from monetary damages in suits by private individuals to
enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act.2'
As demonstrated in Florida Prepaid and Kimel, limits on the
scope of Fourteenth Amendment protection have been critical to
advancing the state sovereignty theory of the current Supreme Court.
Furthermore, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity reflects a
broader concept of state and federal government relationships
subscribed to by at least some members of the Court. To better
understand the vision of federalism that appears to be motivating the
Court, it is important to review prior opinions of Justices leading that
movement. Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
joined in the opinion of the Court in Kimel, favor an agenda that goes
beyond traditional bounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity. They
seek to preclude federal power to enact legislation that intrudes upon
traditional or integral state functions.'
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Kimel demonstrates that her
approach to the Eleventh Amendment is little more than an
alternative route towards achieving the limits on federal power that
were rejected by the Court fifteen years ago in Garcia and to presage
more radical challenges to congressional power. She writes as if
states are free from any potential liability under the ADEA. It thus
appears that the Eleventh Amendment is now being used to vindicate
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's admonition in Garcia, that the
approach he shared with Justice O'Connor would "in time again
command the support of a majority of this Court."' At least some
members of the Court seem bound to ignore limits otherwise
understood in the Eleventh Amendment framework, including both
the doctrine of Ex parte Young and the established rule that the
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude direct federal enforcement
as a means of carrying out their vision of federalism.
Significantly, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Kimel
omitted any reference to the doctrine of Ex parte Young. Introducing
the case, O'Connor made clear that some of the plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, but the parties did not challenge or
even discuss the doctrine that plaintiffs could establish an entitlement
280. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
281. See id. at 962.
282. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579-589 (Rehnquist, CJ. & O'Connor, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
284. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 69.
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to prospective injunctive relief. In keeping with her omission of
references to Ex parte Young, O'Connor's concluding paragraphs
note alternatives remaining for victims of age discrimination based
upon state law, without any reference to the option of seeking
injunctive relief or direct federal enforcement.
It is not clear to what extent other Justices share the apparent
goal of Justice O'Connor to eliminate state liability for federal laws
based upon Congress's Article I authority. Justice Kennedy did not
join with Justice O'Connor, but instead joined a strained concurring
and dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas finding that Congress failed
to adequately abrogate state immunity when it enacted amendments
to the ADEA.' Without explicit abrogation, Justices Thomas and
Kennedy found no need to address questions of federal power
generally, or Eleventh Amendment immunity in particular.'
In prior opinions, Justice Kennedy had referred to the
"essential" role of Ex parte Young in the Court's sovereign immunity
doctrine, noting that "certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief
against state officers must therefore be permitted if the Constitution
is to remain the supreme law of the land."'  Given Justice Kennedy's
focus on the Ex parte Young doctrine in other cases,2 it is hard to
285. An amicus brief in support of the respondent submitted by the Coalition for Local
Sovereignty advocated repudiation of Ex parte Young. The Respondent's Brief, however,
noted that they did not challenge "an individual's authority to bring an injunction action
against State officials in federal court, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), or the
Federal government's authority to bring a claim for injunctive and monetary relief against
States in federal court, see Employees of the Dep't of Public Health and Welfare v.
Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973)." Respondent's Brief, available at,
1999 WL 631661 (1999).
286. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91-92.
287. See id. at 99 (Thomas, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
288 See id.
289. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,777 (1999).
290. In his opinion for the Court in Alden, Justice Kennedy noted doctrines allowing
suits by the federal government and suits for injunctive or declaratory relief, and referred
to them as components of "the proper balance between the supremacy of federal law and
the separate sovereignty of the States." Id. at 757 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)). The division of the Justices regarding the scope of
Ex parte Young was demonstrated by their debate in the case of Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,270-74 (1997). Justice Kennedy, joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, advocated drawing lines based upon whether adequate state forums were
available. In his opinion, Kennedy emphasized the importance of ensuring "the
supremacy of federal statutory and constitutional law." Id. at 270. The concurring
opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Thomas and Scalia, purported to rest on
existing Ex parte Young doctrine, but refused to "extend" that doctrine to a private action
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imagine that he did not have thoughts about application of that
doctrine in Kimel. The fact that the Justices chose not to engage in
discussion of that issue suggests that deep divisions remain within the
ranks of the five Justices who have joined the recent crusade to
expand Eleventh Amendment immunity.29
Justice Steven's dissenting opinion in Kimel acknowledged that,
in his view, the issue at stake was an issue of federal power to
establish employee rights in the broader sense.2' He noted that prior
Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Eleventh Amendment left
open "a State's liability upon enforcement of federal law by federal
agencies, '  clearly doubting whether that door remained ajar after
Kimel. With that note, Justice Stevens signaled his belief that the
majority was intent upon imposing limits on federal power that would
go beyond those traditionally associated with Eleventh Amendment
immunity. States were, in essence, being invited by the majority to
nullify federal law.
In their most recent statement on the issue, the majority by Chief
Justice Rehnquist reassured those who may have feared the loss of all
avenues for enforcement of federal law against the states. In Garrett,
the Court barred private suits for monetary damages resulting from
state violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Chief
Justice explained that persons with disabilities retain "federal
recourse against discrimination... enforced by the United States in
actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions
for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young."294 It is too early to know
whether this statement represents a final word on the issue.
that sought to divest the state of a property interest or to eliminate state regulatory power
over that property. Id. at 296-97. The other four Justices expressed the view that the case
was one which fell "squarely within the Young doctrine." Id. at 297 (Souter, J., with whom
Stevens, Gingsburg and Bryer, J.J., join dissenting). While the split within the majority
demonstrates disagreement regarding application of Ex parte Young, neither of the tests
offered by those Justices offer significant guidance as to where a future majority might
decide to draw those lines.
291. The Court's reluctance to address the Ex parte Young doctrine was again
illustrated when the Justices granted certiorari in Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 528 U.S. 1146
(2000), cert. dismissed 529 U.S. 1001 (2000), agreeing to review the question of whether
Congress had power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, but refusing to review petitioner's second question addressing the district
court's authority to issue injunctive relief.
292. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 98.
294. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 969 n.9.
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B. The Supreme Court and Congressional Roles in Defining
Constitutional Norms
The previous section explained that Supreme Court ambitions to
expand state sovereignty remain subject to Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers. It also described ways in which the Supreme
Court narrowly construed those enforcement powers to limit
congressional authority. As a result, it is important to take a closer
look at the scope of those powers in order to clearly define the
respective roles of Congress and the Supreme Court.
It has become settled law that the Supreme Court determines the
substantive scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress' role
is remedial rather than plenary: "Congress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is."295 This design of
the Fourteenth Amendment maintains traditional separation of
powers between Congress and the Judiciary. The Court recently
explained, "[i]f Congress could define its own powers by altering the
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution
be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means. ' '296
Contrary to superficial appearances, this principle does not
conflict with a conclusion that privileges or immunities can be derived
from federal statutes. To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits state interference with privileges or immunities created by
Congress does nothing to broaden congressional power to establish
such rights. It should be assumed throughout this discussion that
Congress can only act pursuant to powers otherwise established by
the Constitution. This includes both the substantive role identified by
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution (enumerating Congress'
power) and the remedial role identified in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment (granting to Congress power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment provisions).
The inclusion of privileges or immunities derived from Article I
powers of Congress reinforced the nondiscrimination principle that
Nineteenth Century jurists had recognized and associated with this
language. 9  In other words, as with all other equality principles
lodged in the Constitution, the Supreme Court would not expect to
claim a role in defining underlying policy. For example, in the more
traditional context of equal protection principles, the Court would not
295. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,508 (1997).
296. Id. at 529.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 36-60.
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decide whether to issue federal contracts to build new highways, but it
would determine whether rules of competition for those contracts had
been equally applied.' The role of the Court in enforcing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause should follow the same pattern.
Thus, the Court would not decide whether there should be a federally
mandated minimum wage. Once Congress makes that decision,
however, courts would enforce a nondiscrimination principle by
deciding whether states have interfered with a federally created
privilege or immunity.'
Prior cases further illustrate the roles of Congress and the courts
in this context. Congress has the authority to regulate use of federal
property. The substance of that regulation must be determined in the
first instance by Congress, not by the courts. Once Congress
determined that citizens of the United States should be allowed to
establish homesteads on federal property, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause reinforced the Supremacy Clause and assured that
state officials would not be allowed to interfere with that use.'
Similarly, once Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act,
states could not interfere with pursuit of rights derived from that
Act.3 ' In both cases, states could not decide that some favored
citizens within the state enjoyed the benefit of federal law while
other, less-favored citizens were denied that benefit. The fact that
Congress, rather than the courts, decided in the first instance to
establish federal property rights or labor law did not alter the
traditional Supreme Court role in assuring access to those rights free
from state interference. In both cases, authority to enact the original
legislation was derived from Article I of the Constitution and that
authority remained subject to Supreme Court review.
This approach to interpretation of privileges or immunities does
not entail the interpretive dilemma that arose when Congress
asserted a greater independent role in determining the substantive
scope of the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Kimel, Florida Prepaid and Garrett. By
enacting laws authorized by Article I, Congress does not change the
"paramount law" of the Constitution. Congress does not recast the
substantive scope of the Bill of Rights when it relies upon the
298. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200. 238 (1995) (using strict
scrutiny to review race-based affirmative action in federal contracts).
299. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
300. See United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
301. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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Commerce Clause to enact civil rights legislation, and the substantive
scope of the Commerce Clause remains subject to judicial
constraints.' Concluding that privileges or immunities may be
created by Congress through its legitimate exercise of Article I
powers does not change the fundamental nature of congressional
authority; Congress' Section 5 power continues to be "corrective or
preventive, not definitional."'
This enunciation of a nondiscrimination principle may sound like
nothing more than a restatement of the Supremacy Clause. As
previously noted, Justice Field asked the majority in the Slaughter-
House Cases why the Privileges or Immunities Clause should be cited
as authority for the principle that federal law is superior to state law,
and state law must therefore give way.' If the answer to that
question seemed mysterious in 1872, the Supreme Court has now
solved the mystery. In its Eleventh Amendment cases, the Court
determined, in effect, that prior to the Fourteenth Amendment,
superiority of federal law did not imply a right of individuals to
enforce that law against the states.305 Cogent arguments have been
made by many others, including four Justices of the Supreme Court,
that this interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment lacks textual,
historical, or principled support.30 If one makes the assumption,
however, that current Supreme Court interpretation of the
relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and preceding
articles of the Constitution is correct, then the Privileges or
Immunities Clause changed that interpretation when individual rights
or interests have been established by federal law and federal courts
are called upon to protect those rights from state abridgement.
There is a second, more deeply rooted reason for believing that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause includes a nondiscrimination
element tied to federal legislation. Ample evidence suggests that
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment anticipated a more proactive
role for Congress than subsequent Supreme Court decisions allowed.
The Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871, and 1875 document
contemplation of such a role. History of that time period, previously
recounted, demonstrates an understanding that, not only would
302. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740,1754 (2000).
303. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
305. See supra text accompanying note 257-258.
306. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Stevens, J., Souter, J.,
Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting). See also supra articles cited in note 1.
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federal law be needed to block imposition of repressive Black Codes,
but also that there would be concern about state interference with
those federal laws:' In 1875, members of Congress accurately
anticipated that federal law would be needed to bar race
discrimination in establishment of contract or property rights.
Although the Civil Rights Cases ruled that Congress lacked power to
address questions about private discriminatory acts, that decision has
been overtaken by time and events. Viewed from a contemporary
perspective, congressional power derived from the Commerce Clause
authorizes legislation that bars racial discrimination in both private
and public employment. Only by dramatically reversing course could
the Justices now declare that, when applied to the states, civil rights
legislation must be limited in scope by the Court's interpretations of
the Equal Protection Clause while at the same time broader
interpretations of the same acts can be applied to private employers.'
When congressional action has been firmly grounded in the
Commerce Clause, and that legislation secures interests consistent
with a traditional concept of privileges or immunities, then the courts
should not impose additional tests of "proportionality" to determine
whether such acts can be enforced against states through private
actions in federal court. But this is not because Congress has been
given independent authority to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Boerne v. Flores, Congress was challenged for having attempted to
rewrite the First Amendment. In Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett
the Court limited congressional power to broaden the scope of due
process or equal protection. In contrast, when enforcing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the scope and validity of the
congressional act stems from the Commerce Clause or other Article I
sources and cannot be seriously questioned.
There should also not be questions about congressional control
over enforcement of such legislation against state officials. When
rights derived from Commerce Clause legislation are seen as
privileges or immunities of citizens, the text of the Fourteenth
307. See supra text accompanying notes 75-88.
308. Unlike recent conflict between Congress and the Supreme Court over authority to
interpret the Bill of Rights, the Court has not questioned congressional power to exercise
its Commerce Clause authority in ways which differ from the Court's analysis of the Equal
Protection Clause. See Ward's Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
Note also that the Supreme Court has explicitly deferred to congressional expertise in
defining the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment. See United States v. Kominski, 487 U.S.
931, 939 (1988) (refusing to find that the phrase "involuntary servitude" could be based on
purely psychological coercion absent congressional decisions to that effect).
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Amendment provides freedom from state interference. If the
question is whether the Eleventh Amendment bars private parties
from bringing such actions in federal court, then the Privileges or
Immunities Clause also provides an unambiguous answer to that
question by explicitly protecting individuals from state abridgement
of their rights. Congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is nothing more than an exercise of remedial power,
authorized by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The route to making broad civil rights legislation a responsibility
of the federal government was more circuitous than that
contemplated by framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, a coherent conception of the Constitution as an organic
document supports the conclusion that Congress was empowered by
the Commerce Clause to enact such legislation and by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause to determine how it should be enforced.
Ignoring the latter, the current Supreme Court majority has
committed itself to capturing the spirit of the Eleventh Amendment
based upon "the importance of sovereign immunity to the founding
generation ' but in doing so, it has ignored the "sense and reason of
the law" as modified by the Reconstruction Amendments."' By
allowing states to effectively nullify federal law, the Justices have
resurrected John C. Calhoun's conception of state sovereignty311 and
ignored that of John Bingham.
C. Reconsidering Privileges or Immunities
The preceding discussion questions whether the matrix of rules
that the Court is constructing around the Eleventh Amendment is
consistent with the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In developing
these rules, the Court has recognized that Congress only lacks power
to abrogate state immunity if its enforcement authority is derived
from the main body of the Constitution. As recognized by Justice
Kennedy: "[I]n adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people
required the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had
been preserved to them by the original Constitution, so that Congress
may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to
309. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,726-727 (1999).
310. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
311. See David Milton Whalen, John C. Calhoun Becomes the Tenth Justice: State
Sovereignty, Judicial Review and Environmental Law after June 23, 1999, 27 B. C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 193 (1999) (sharing the view that the Supreme Court's Eleventh
Amendment decisions resurrect Calhoun's conception of state nullification).
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its § 5 enforcement power." '312 The Court rejected claims that state
sovereignty could be defeated by federal law that appeared
disproportionate to the scope of arguable due process or equal
protection violations.3 Throughout those opinions, however, the
Court has never seriously entertained questions about the scope of
congressional authority derived from the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The fact that the Supreme Court and constitutional scholars have
generally ignored Privileges or Immunities Clause authority for
enforcement of congressional actions against the state should not
come as a surprise. As previously noted, generally accepted
interpretations of the Slaughter-House Cases sharply reduced the
concept of privileges or immunities as an independent source of
substantive law. Justice Miller's opinion in that case unquestionably
recognized federal law as a source of privileges or immunities;
subsequent congressional actions and Supreme Court decisions
reinforced and never questioned that recognition. Those
interpretations, however, did not in any significant way expand
congressional law-making authority. The importance of reinforcing
the Supremacy Clause, while understandable in light of antebellum
conceptions of state sovereignty, seemed meaningless to Twentieth
Century judges and scholars.314 The Supreme Court's apparent move
towards using the Eleventh Amendment as a broad source for
securing state sovereignty creates the need to reconsider ways in
which state and federal sovereign relationships were altered by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.
We now know that Congress has the authority to assure that all
citizens of the United States enjoy equal rights to enter into contracts
and to possess property whenever regulation of those interests has a
substantial cumulative effect on interstate commerce. We know that
Congress was empowered to protect these rights by the Commerce
Clause even if not by the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments.
We should also acknowledge that, given the repeated references to
312. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
313. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955
(2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (rejecting Equal Protection
Clause authority for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (rejecting
due process arguments as basis for state liability for patent infringements).
314. Hence the equation of references to the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
restating the Supremacy Clause with statements that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
had become a dead letter. See supra notes 8,10.
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Justice Washington's definition in Corfield v. Coryell,315 privileges or
immunities include such rights.
If a particular interest would be considered a "privilege" or an
"immunity" when regulated by the state, then parallel use of that
language in the Fourteenth Amendment should suggest that the same
interests would be considered privileges or immunities of United
States citizenship when protected by federal law. One may ask, for
example, whether states could protect their own citizens from age
discrimination in employment while denying that protection to
nonresident employees. Similarly, one may ask whether states could
provide a minimum wage for resident employees, but deny equal
treatment to nonresidents. One reason why states could not
discriminate in such a manner is that equal treatment in employment
relationships has long been recognized as embedded in the concept of
privileges or immunities.
Another way to understand the scope of protection for privileges
or immunities is to ask whether the interests affected by a given law
would be protected by a common Nineteenth Century treaty clause
assuring that citizens from one nation were entitled to the privileges
or immunities of citizens when working or doing business within the
316territory of another nation. For example, if a treaty with Spain
guaranteed privileges or immunities, could a Spanish citizen have
relied on that treaty to establish patent rights within the United
States? What would be the answer if, in a treaty acquiring Louisiana,
the United States guaranteed that all inhabitants of the territory
would enjoy "all of the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens
of the United States"?. 7  If patent rights were privileges or
immunities in a treaty context, then they should also enjoy that status
within the United States. No self-respecting Nineteenth Century
judge would have failed to recognize that patent rights were privileges
or immunities of United States citizens.
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may not have conceived
of Article I authority in a manner that would have embraced
contemporary labor laws or civil rights legislation. That does not
mean, however, that the framers failed to recognize employment
315. 6 F.Cas. 546,551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
316. For an account of various treaties of territorial accession guaranteeing to
territorial inhabitants "all the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the
United States," see AMAR, supra note 10, at 167-68.
317. Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, April 30,
1803, 8 Stat. 200,202.
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relationships, contract rights, and property rights as privileges or
immunities. The legislative record following ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment adequately demonstrated such a conception.
When the Supreme Court ruled in the Civil Rights Cases that
Congress lacked power to address private acts of discrimination, they
did so after acknowledging that rights to employment and public
accommodations could appropriately be characterized as privileges or
immunities."' Although enforcement of the state action doctrine
limited development of that conception in the century which
followed, that should not alter the fact that such interests fall within a
reasonable definition of privileges or immunities as those terms were
being used in 1869.
A remaining objection, voiced in particular by Justice Thomas in
his dissenting opinion in Saenz v. Roe,.. is that only "fundamental"
privileges or immunities "rather than every public benefit established
by positive law" were meant to have been protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic error Justice Thomas makes
results from his focus on the specific content of legislation rather than
on the broad principle that was enforced by the majority's
interpretation. Thus, Justice Thomas would have ruled that welfare
benefits are not fundamental and, therefore, not protected when state
law discriminates by reducing welfare assistance to new residents.
The majority, however, understood that the fundamental principle
involved is the right to travel from one state to another without
experiencing such discrimination.3' In the same sense, the question
of whether federal statutes constitute privileges or immunities should
not be resolved on the basis of whether Justice Thomas would
consider the specific statutory interests fundamental or enduring, but
rather on whether the statute is meant to have general application to
all United States citizens. Courts should look at the fundamental
principle that all federal statutory rights should be enforced equally
318. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 21.
319. 526 U.S. 489,527 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
320. The Supreme Court recognized the right to travel from one state to another free
from discrimination when they struck down the capitation tax in Crandall v. State of
Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867). In 1872, Justice Miller explicitly ruled that discrimination
against travelers into a state was a clear example of state action prohibited by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872). It
was not the seriousness of the amount of the tax, but rather the discrimination against new
arrivals from other states that gave rise to Justice Miller's conclusion. Reduced welfare
benefits in Saenz v. Roe have the same tendency to discourage travel by individuals with
limited means as the tax that was declared unconstitutional in Crandall.
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throughout the United States; that federal supremacy binds us
together as citizens of a single nation living under the same law.
Congress may use the power it derives from the Commerce
Clause, the Property Clause, or any other source of authority found in
the Constitution to establish rights of United States citizens. This
does not mean that all federal laws suddenly fall within the definition
of privileges or immunities that can be enforced by private individuals
against the states. Established rules requiring clear and unambiguous
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity would presumably
apply in the context of determining the scope of Fourteenth
Amendment privileges or immunities. 21  Rules developed by the
Supreme Court to determine whether statutory claims should be
considered "rights, privileges or immunities" protected by section
1983 also presumably apply.32 The only other substantive constraint
should be based upon whether the federal statute was intended to
have general applicability and to promote the "enjoyment of life and
liberty" or "to pursue and obtain happiness and safety."
323
Employment and property rights fall well within this definition; if
asked the right question, the Supreme Court should reverse its
finding of state immunity from monetary damages caused by denial of
these federal rights. 4
When the Supreme Court rejected arguments that the Americans
with Disabilities Act could be based upon congressional power to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause, the majority reasoned that
discrimination against people with disabilities may be rational even if
heartless.' 6 The Court should reconsider state immunity from suits to
enforce the ADA, however, because the purposes of that legislation,
321. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223,228 (1989).
322. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989). See
generally supra text accompanying notes 218-225. Note that rules which deny protections
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Congress provided alternative remedies, see Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1 (1981), should not
be viewed as limiting the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
323. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
324. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (blocking state court enforcement of the
Fair Labor Standards Act); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (barring enforcement of federal patent rights against
states). A more difficult question is whether Indian gaming rights that were at issue in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), or treaty rights at issue in Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), would be included within a reasonable
definition of privileges or immunities.
325. See Garret, 121 S. Ct. 955.
326. See id. at 964.
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"to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency" for individuals with
disabilities,3 27 demonstrates contemporary congressional concern for
privileges or immunities. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 sought to
ensure that all citizens would enjoy "full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property." The ADA
embraces the same spirit. Although congressional power to enact
legislation protecting these interests may be derived from the
Commerce Clause, the authority to enforce these rights against the
states can be found in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Conclusion
In Seminole Tribes and the cases that followed, the Supreme
Court rejected arguments that Congress could exercise its Article I
powers to abrogate state immunity. The Justices never indicated,
however, whether in doing so they intended to overrule precedent
ranging from the Slaughter-House Cases to Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization.32 The Court ignored its own history that
demonstrates that the Privileges or Immunities Clause reinforced the
Supremacy Clause, and that privileges or immunities could be
established through federal legislation derived from Article I
authority.
Federal statutes creating homestead rights also created privileges
or immunities of United States citizens.3 29 No principled distinction
can be made between homestead rights and patent rights. When both
have been established by federal law, it follows that both constitute
privileges or immunities of United States citizens.
States would not be allowed to bar age discrimination against
their own residents while permitting state agencies to discriminate
against nonresident elderly citizens. Nor could a minimum wage law
protect conditions of employment for a state's own citizens, but deny
those rights to employees from other states. Terms or conditions of
employment constitute privileges or immunities protected by Article
IV, Section 2 of the Constitution; states that discriminate against
nonresidents in ways that affect basic employment rights violate the
327. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)(1995).
328. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
329. See United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884) (holding that rights established
by federal homestead acts were rights or privileges secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States).
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privileges and immunities of those nonresidents. If Congress enacts
comparable laws, then those laws constitute privileges or immunities
of national citizenship.
When the Supreme Court was asked to define the scope of civil
rights statutes that protect the rights, privileges or immunities of
United States citizens, it ruled that this language incorporated federal
statutory rights.'l Although the Court did not reference the
Fourteenth Amendment when it reached this decision, its conclusion
was consistent with views expressed at the time of ratification. The
Court now faces a heavy, if not impossible task of explaining why the
phrase "privileges or immunities" should mean one thing when it
appears in the Fourteenth Amendment and something different when
it appears in the statute enacted to enforce that Amendment.
These arguments lead to a conclusion that the outcome in at least
four recent Supreme Court decisions should be reversed."' A
question that follows is whether these arguments offer too little and
come too late. The same question must have been asked in 1984
when the Court was asked to review its holding that city contracts
could require employment of city residents.332 The Court had rejected
similar arguments the prior year when asked whether the Commerce
Clause prohibited such contracts.333 Because Commerce Clause
jurisprudence had dominated debates about this issue, attorneys had
ignored the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. The
Court changed its answer, without retreating from precedent, because
lawyers in the prior case had simply asked the wrong question.' A
similar reversal should now take place when courts are asked whether
Congress has power to abrogate state immunity when doing so to
protect privileges or immunities established by federal law.
The current Supreme Court majority's conception of state
sovereignty clashes with the new federalism that emerged from the
330. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
331. Based upon these arguments, the outcome would change in the Court's decisions
in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (finding state immunity from patent claims); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999) (upholding state immunity in state courts from claims based upon the Fair Labor
Standards Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding state
immunity from claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001) (holding states
immune from money damages for violations of the ADA).
332. See United Bldg., 465 U.S. 208.
333. White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employees, 460 U.S. 204,213 (1983).
334. See CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 32.04 (2d ed. 1997).
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Civil War. In arguments about this issue, the Prixileges or
Immunities Clause is the missing link that, when understood,
reestablishes federal authority. If Congress has power to prohibit age
discrimination and to protect wages and conditions of employment,
then it also has authority to enforce those laws against the states. In
addition to the Supremacy Clause, this enforcement power can be
derived from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; it therefore
overrides the Eleventh Amendment. In recent decisions limiting the
authority of Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,
counsel never asked the Supreme Court to apply the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That question
should now be asked.
